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Time and accident are committing daily havoc on the originals depo-
sited in our public offices. The late war has done the work of centuries 
in this business. The lost cannot be recovered, but let us save what 
remains; not by vaults and locks which fence them from the public eye 
and use in consigning them to the waste of time, but by such multipli-
cation of copies, as shall place them beyond the reach of accident. 
 
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Ebenezer Howard (Feb. 18, 1791), in 
3 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 211, 211 (H.A. Washington 
ed., 1871).1 
  INTRODUCTION   
A cyberattack was causing Iran‘s uranium-enrichment cen-
trifuges to secretly malfunction. The devices, responsible for 
concentrating uranium gas to produce a weapons-grade version 
of the element, were spinning too fast, based on incorrect in-
structions from their computer controllers.2 Simultaneously, 
those computers were sending reassuring data back to the Ira-
nian engineers monitoring them, painting a false picture of 
normal operation.3 Over time, the centrifuges‘ rotors began to 
wobble, destroying some of the machines and damaging others.4 
 
 1. I thank Bill Merkel for this quote. 
 2. William J. Broad et al., Israel Tests Called Crucial in Iran Nuclear 
Setback, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2011, at A1. 
 3. Christopher Williams, Western Power Created Virus to Sabotage Iran‘s 
Nuclear Plans, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Jan. 22, 2011, at 20. 
 4. Mark Clayton, Stuxnet Attack on Iran Nuclear Program Came About a 
Year Ago, Report Says, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Jan. 3, 2011, 4:53 PM), http:// 
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The concealed overspin set back Iran‘s efforts to acquire nuc-
lear weapons by at least three years, according to American 
and Israeli intelligence sources.5 The cause: the most sophisti-
cated cyberweapon yet created, known as Stuxnet. Engineered 
to activate its payload only when operating within Iran‘s 
enrichment system,6 Stuxnet recorded normal operating data, 
sped up the rotors, and then fed the recorded data back to the 
controllers. It was the ultimate stealth assault. 
Stuxnet succeeded where conventional efforts to delay 
Iran‘s nuclear ambitions—from diplomacy to threats of force—
had failed.7 Moreover, the superworm operated with utter de-
niability: although it seems clear that the cyberattack resulted 
from a joint Israeli-American operation, there is no concrete 
evidence to link the two countries to Stuxnet.8 The hack dam-
aged Iran‘s atomic program to roughly the same degree that a 
conventional airstrike would have,9 but without killing Iranian 
personnel and revealing the (likely Israeli)10 identity of the 
country launching the military attack. From the U.S. perspec-
tive, this was the perfect kill: an attack that badly hurt Iran‘s 
nuclear enrichment regime, with no human casualties, no harm 
to America‘s international image, and no evidence to point con-
clusively to Stuxnet‘s creators. Exploiting an Iranian cyberse-
curity weakness proved enormously valuable and perfectly de-
niable. Stuxnet demonstrates vividly the power of 
cyberweapons and the risks of inadequate cybersecurity. 
Cybersecurity is a conundrum. Scholars, government offi-
cials, journalists, and computer scientists all agree that inade-
 
www.csmonitor.com/USA/2011/0103/Stuxnet-attack-on-Iran-nuclear-program-came 
-about-a-year-ago-report-says. 
 5. Broad et al., supra note 2. 
 6. Kim Zetter, Report: Stuxnet Hit 5 Gateway Targets on Its Way to Ira-
nian Plant, WIRED (Feb. 11, 2011, 8:05 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/ 
2011/02/stuxnet-five-main-target/. 
 7. See, e.g., Richard A. Falkenrath, Op-Ed., From Bullets to Megabytes, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2011, at A31 (―A sophisticated half-megabyte of computer 
code apparently accomplished what a half-decade of United Nations Security 
Council resolutions could not.‖). 
 8. Broad et al., supra note 2. 
 9. See The Unconventional Attack on Iran, MISSINGPEACE (Nov. 29, 
2010, 3:20 PM), http://missingpeace.eu/en/2010/11/the-unconventional-attack 
-on-iran (explaining that, because of the potential for reactor meltdown, 
―Stuxnet could even be more effective than an airstrike‖). 
 10. Christopher Williams, Israeli Security Chief Celebrates Stuxnet Cyber 
Attack, THE TELEGRAPH (Feb. 16, 2011, 7:00 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/ 
technology/news/8326274/Israeli-security-chief-celebrates-Stuxnet-cyber-attack 
.html. 
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quate security is an emerging threat—perhaps even a cata-
strophic one—and that preventive action is urgently needed. 
However, no one can agree on precisely what cybersecurity 
means, or requires. Presidential task forces have recommended 
widespread changes to safeguard America‘s cyber-systems;11 
scores of bills have been introduced in Congress;12 international 
treaties have been mooted.13 By most accounts, the virtual sky 
is about to fall. Yet, despite nearly a decade of sustained atten-
tion, little, if any, cybersecurity progress has occurred.  
This Article argues that the current failure to meaningfully 
address this problem occurs because cybersecurity is under-
theorized: it is, at best, poorly defined, and it lacks a coherent 
framework to guide change. Current scholarship on cybersecur-
ity is moored in doctrinal models that both misdiagnose the  
relevant issues and offer answers that would badly damage the 
net‘s innovative capacity. Drawing upon scholarship in econom-
ics, behavioral biology, and mathematics, this Article seeks to 
remedy these shortcomings with a theoretical model oriented 
around information, in distinction to the near-obsession with 
technological infrastructure demonstrated by contemporary 
scholars. This information-based approach to cybersecurity, 
which focuses on access and alteration of data and on guaran-
teeing its integrity, can remediate critical threats.  
To implement the theory‘s recommendations, this Article 
suggests, counter intuitively, that creating inefficient storage 
and network connections best protects cybersecurity. Moreover, 
it points out clearly that cybersecurity policy necessitates diffi-
cult tradeoffs, particularly between ensuring authorized access 
and alteration and preventing unauthorized interaction with 
data. This Article outlines implementation through legislation 
that requires inefficient data storage for entities holding criti-
cal information, mandates testing that redundant storage, and 
invests in transitioning organizations to the new regulatory re-
 
 11. See generally Bill Lane, Cyber Security and Communications, Fed. 
Commc‘ns Comm‘n, http://www.fcc.gov/pshs/techtopics/techtopics20.html ( last  
visited Nov. 7, 2011) (listing presidential directives and task force efforts). 
 12. See, e.g., Gautham Nagesh, Senators Debate Terms of Cybersecurity 
Overhaul, THE HILL (June 29, 2010, 10:33 AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/hillicon 
-valley/technology/106119-senators-debate-terms-of-cybersecurity-overhaul (de-
scribing three different bills addressing cybersecurity concerns). 
 13. See, e.g., John Markoff, Steps Taken to End Impasse Over Cybersecuri-
ty Talks, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2010, at A7 (describing a set of cybersecurity 
recommendations that mark steps toward a resolution of American opposition 
to a Russian-proposed treaty on cybersecurity). 
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gime. Next, it describes regulation that generates inefficient 
network connectivity by subsidizing interconnection, maintain-
ing links between network providers during disputes, and ex-
ploring research into heterogeneous routing as a last-resort op-
tion. Lastly, this Article describes the stakes in cybersecurity 
debates: adopting current scholarly approaches risks jeopardiz-
ing not only the architecture that makes the Internet a potent 
medium for innovation and communication, but also key Amer-
ican normative commitments to free expression on-line. 
This Article, to be plain, is a significant departure from the 
conventional academic wisdom on cybersecurity. Contemporary 
scholarly efforts on the topic remain rigidly locked into familiar 
doctrinal models, particularly public international law,14 the 
law of armed conflict,15 and criminal law.16 While scholars ad-
mit that cybersecurity fits poorly in these conceptual boxes, 
they nevertheless seek to remold its challenges to fit their 
tools.17 Thus, the dominant analytical mode for cybersecurity 
concentrates heavily on the identity and intent of the malicious 
actor. Susan W. Brenner notes that cybercrime and cyberter-
rorism encompass similar actions—―only the motivation dif-
fers.‖18 Kelly A. Gable classifies cyberterrorism by intent, as 
 
 14. See, e.g., Jeffrey Hunker, U.S. International Policy for Cybersecurity: 
Five Issues that Won‘t Go Away, 4 J. NAT‘L SECURITY L. & POL‘Y 197, 212 
(2010) (―Looking toward existing international regimes that have parallels to 
cyber seems a useful way of gaining insight into what an international cyber-
security regime might look like.‖). 
 15. See, e.g., Davis Brown, A Proposal for an International Convention to 
Regulate the Use of Information Systems in Armed Conflict, 47 HARV. INT‘L 
L.J. 179, 190 (2006) (―It is both necessary and appropriate that the same prin-
ciples of international law intended to regulate conventional armed conflict 
and reduce its adverse effects apply to information warfare.‖). See generally 
David E. Graham, Cyber Threats and the Law of War, 4 J. NAT‘L SECURITY. L. 
& POL‘Y 87 (2010) (discussing how the law of war might apply to cyberattacks). 
 16. See, e.g., Debra Wong Yang & Brian M. Hoffstadt, Countering the Cy-
ber-Crime Threat, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 201, 203 (2006) (examining familiar 
doctrinal models such as ―leaving the burdens of cyber-crime on victim compa-
nies, of placing it upon the software and hardware manufacturers, of expanding 
the role of governmental regulation, and of a combination of all three options‖). 
 17. See, e.g., Susan W. Brenner, ―At Light Speed‖: Attribution and Re-
sponse to Cybercrime/Terrorism/Warfare, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 379, 
379 (2007) (stating that the ―speed and anonymity of cyber attacks makes dis-
tinguishing among the actions of terrorists, criminals, and nation states diffi-
cult‖ (quoting DEP‘T OF HOMELAND SEC., THE NATIONAL STRATEGY TO SECURE 
CYBERSPACE viii (2003) [hereinafter NATIONAL STRATEGY TO SECURE CYBER-
SPACE], available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/National_Cyberspace_ 
Strategy.pdf )). 
 18. Id. at 399. 
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crime ―with the purpose of coercing a government to alter its 
policies.‖19 Sean Watts identifies state affiliation as ―an irreduc-
ible minimum of lawful participation in CNA [computer net-
work attacks].‖20 Matthew J. Sklerov notes that the ―current 
legal paradigm . . . requires attribution to a state or its 
agents.‖21 Stephen Dycus states that lack of attribution under-
cuts deterrence and a state‘s ability to respond to an attack.22 
Richard A. Clarke and Robert A. Knake focus on attribution 
and its attendant challenges, particularly in proving that a 
state is the perpetrator of a cyber-threat.23 Eric T. Jensen de-
scribes the ―inability to attribute cyber attacks‖24 as a ―signifi-
cant problem that plagues cybersecurity,‖25 and that ―compli-
cate[s] a state‘s response‖ to an attack.26 Milton L. Mueller 
proposes a new, distributed, peer-produced governance model 
to deal with ―difficult-to-trace actions and distributed actors 
and attacks that easily cross national borders.‖27 Attributing 
Internet actions to a particular actor, and discerning their mo-
tivations, is essential for these scholars to employ preexisting 
doctrinal responses. 
However, attribution of a cyberthreat to a particular actor 
on the Internet—to say nothing of divining that actor‘s intent—
is highly difficult given the network‘s open, anonymous, distri-
buted architecture.28 Unsurprisingly, then, nearly all scholars 
 
 19. Kelly A. Gable, Cyber-Apocalypse Now: Securing the Internet Against 
Cyberterrorism and Using Universal Jurisdiction as a Deterrent, 43 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT‘L L. 57, 62–63 (2010) (citing BERNADETTE SCHELL & CLEMENS 
MARTIN, WEBSTER‘S NEW WORLD HACKER DICTIONARY 87 (2006)). 
 20. Sean Watts, Combatant Status and Computer Network Attack, 50 VA. 
J. INT‘L L. 391, 396 (2010). 
 21. Matthew J. Sklerov, Solving the Dilemma of State Responses to Cy-
berattacks: A Justification for the Use of Active Defenses Against States Who 
Neglect Their Duty to Prevent, 201 MIL. L. REV. 1, 7 (2009). 
 22. Stephen Dycus, Congress‘s Role in Cyber Warfare, 4 J. NAT‘L SECURITY 
L. & POL‘Y 155, 163–64 (2010). 
 23. RICHARD A. CLARKE & ROBERT A. KNAKE, CYBER WAR 214–15, 248–52 
(2010). 
 24. Eric Talbot Jensen, Cyber Warfare and Precautions Against the Effects 
of Attacks, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1533, 1538 (2010). 
 25. Id.  
 26. Id. at 1542. 
 27. MILTON L. MUELLER, NETWORKS AND STATES 182 (2010). 
 28. See, e.g., Dycus, supra note 22 (arguing that the ―difficulty identifying 
the source of a cyber attack‖ renders traditional deterrence-based policies of 
retaliation impractical); Gable, supra note 19, at 102 (discussing how the ease 
of ―spoofing‖ IP addresses allows cyberterrorists to ―manipulate and obfuscate‖ 
their true points of origin, limiting the usefulness of point-of-attack attribution 
in assigning blame for cyberterrorist attacks). 
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seek to redesign the Internet to improve attribution. By making 
it possible, if not mandatory, for data to be linked to its source, 
this proposed change would enable legal scholars to remain 
comfortably within familiar modes of analysis. Forcing cyberse-
curity into these traditions, though, has significant negative ef-
fects. Requiring attribution undercuts the innovative architec-
ture of the Internet—what Jonathan L. Zittrain terms its 
―generativity.‖29 It confers greater control on authoritarian re-
gimes that seek to censor speech, such as China and Iran.30 
And it threatens to shift Americans away from shared norma-
tive commitments to open communication as a powerful demo-
cratizing force.31 Current scholarship, in short, would destroy 
the Internet in a futile attempt to save it. This Article proposes 
a better path. 
This Article proceeds in six parts. In Part I, it describes the 
difficulties that previous scholars and policymakers have en-
countered when attempting to define a theoretical model for 
cybersecurity, and how they have reacted by attempting to 
force it into existing but ill-fitting paradigms such as interna-
tional law, the law of armed conflict, and criminal law. This Ar-
ticle describes how this lack of vision produces a dangerous pol-
icy agenda: altering the Internet‘s fundamental design to 
require attribution of communications. Next, Part II catalogues 
the apocalyptic descriptions of cybersecurity risks, which create 
a rush to regulate that is likely to be even more harmful than 
the chimerical horrors of the risks themselves. Part III draws 
upon analogous scholarship in behavioral biology, economics, 
and mathematics to produce a radical, insightful new approach 
to cybersecurity that is oriented around information. It argues 
that an information-based approach requires focusing on the 
positive and negative aspects of information access and altera-
tion, with second-order considerations of guaranteeing data in-
tegrity. This Article then applies the new theoretical model to 
 
 29. Jonathan L. Zittrain, The Generative Internet, 119 HARV. L. REV. 
1974, 2030–31 (2006). 
 30. See generally ACCESS DENIED: THE PRACTICE AND POLICY OF GLOBAL 
INTERNET FILTERING (Ronald Deibert et al. eds., 2008) (discussing the history 
and practice of State Internet filtering around the world). 
 31. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton‘s speech on Internet freedom on 
February 15, 2011, is but the latest exemplar. Hillary Rodham Clinton, U.S. 
Sec‘y of State, Address at George Washington University, Internet Rights and 
Wrongs: Choices & Challenges in a Networked World (Feb. 15, 2011), availa-
ble at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/02/156619.htm (discussing state 
interference with the Internet during protests in Iran and Egypt and calling 
for a global commitment to Internet freedom). 
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generate a surprising solution to positive issues of access and 
alteration: inefficiency as defense. (The next article in this cy-
bersecurity project will address the negative aspects of access 
and alteration.) Part IV details how regulation can achieve 
helpful inefficiency in redundant data storage and network 
connectivity, and the tradeoffs this prescription creates for pre-
venting unauthorized access and alteration. In Part V, this Ar-
ticle examines how cybersecurity may fundamentally shift 
American normative commitments to open communication on-
line, and the risks this creates as authoritarian states employ 
security as a pretext for restricting free expression. This Article 
concludes by describing the new theory‘s emphasis on resil-
ience, the limits of law as a cybersecurity tool, and other con-
texts in which inefficiency confers benefits. 
Solving cybersecurity‘s conundrum requires a new theoret-
ical approach that prizes information over infrastructure. This 
Article shows us how to do that. 
I.  WHAT IS CYBERSECURITY?   
Conceptualizing cybersecurity challenges policymakers and 
academics.32 The current theoretical approaches to cybersecuri-
ty, though, have proved to be significantly flawed. They employ 
definitions that are vague and overbroad; they seek to force cy-
bersecurity‘s issues into the straitjackets of existing doctrines 
poorly suited to cybersecurity‘s problems; and they produce 
concomitant policy recommendations that not only fail to miti-
gate, but actually worsen, the Internet‘s security challenges.  
Conventional wisdom on cybersecurity identifies the prob-
lem as all-encompassing.33 Scholars, government officials, and 
journalists tend to view cybersecurity as the ―protection of all 
things Internet‖34—an approach that impedes practical 
progress by failing to set priorities. Government efforts at cap-
turing cybersecurity‘s scope have been particularly overbroad. 
 
 32. The term cybersecurity suffers from what Thomas S. Kuhn calls ―in-
commensurability‖: although different actors employ the same word, it carries 
divergent meanings, assumptions, and value structures for each of them. 
THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 148–49 (3d 
ed. 1996). 
 33. See Peter Sommer & Ian Brown, Reducing Systemic Cybersecurity 
Risk, ORGANISATION FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., 9–14 (Jan. 14, 2011), 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/57/44/46889922.pdf (tracing the history of cyber-
security threats and concerns). 
 34. Jill R. Aitoro, Cybersecurity, NEXTGOV (Oct. 1, 2008), http://www 
.nextgov.com/the_basics/tb_20080523_5125.php. 
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President Barack H. Obama‘s Cyberspace Policy Review offers 
a representative definition, where cybersecurity is: 
strategy, policy, and standards regarding the security of and opera-
tions in cyberspace, and encompasses the full range of threat reduc-
tion, vulnerability reduction, deterrence, international engagement, 
incident response, resiliency, and recovery policies and activities, in-
cluding computer network operations, information assurance, law en-
forcement, diplomacy, military, and intelligence missions as they re-
late to the security and stability of the global information and 
communications infrastructure.35 
Presidential policies have been strikingly consistent. Pres-
ident Barack Obama‘s approach to cybersecurity is almost 
identical to the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initia-
tive (CNCI), the strategy employed by Obama‘s Republican 
predecessor, President George W. Bush.36 Their cybersecurity 
definitions and programs are closely aligned; indeed, Richard 
Clarke and Robert Knake call Obama‘s plan ―CNCI redux.‖37 
Both policies build on the recommendations and definitions (in 
particular, of critical infrastructure) of President William J. 
Clinton‘s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection.38 
Regardless of political affiliation, American Presidents have 
taken an expansive view of cybersecurity. 
Proposed federal legislation is equally capacious in ap-
proach. The National Cyber Infrastructure Protection Act of 
2010 defines ―cyber security activities‖ as: 
 
 35. CYBERSPACE POLICY REVIEW: ASSURING A TRUSTED AND RESILIENT 
INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE 2 (2010) [hereinafter 
CYBERSPACE POLICY REVIEW], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/ 
documents/Cyberspace_Policy_Review_final.pdf. 
 36. See Nat‘l Sec. Council, The Comprehensive National Cybersecurity In-
itiative, THE WHITE HOUSE, 1, http://www.whitehouse.gov/cybersecurity/ 
comprehensive-national-cybersecurity-initiative ( last visited November 7, 2011) 
(stating that Obama‘s policies ―build on the Comprehensive National Cyberse-
curity Initiative (CNCI) launched by President George W. Bush in National 
Security Presidential Directive 54/Homeland Security Presidential Directive 
23 (NSPD-54/HSPD-23) in January 2008‖). 
 37. CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 23, at 118. 
 38. THE PRESIDENT‘S COMM. ON CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROT., CRITI-
CAL FOUNDATIONS: PROTECTING AMERICA‘S INFRASTRUCTURES 3 (Oct. 1997), 
available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/library/pccip.pdf (defining critical infra-
structures as those that are ―so vital that their incapacitation or destruction 
would have a debilitating impact on defense or economic security‖); see Wil-
liam J. Clinton, Presidential Decision Directive 63/NSC-63 (May 22, 1998), 
reprinted in BRIAN T. BENNETT, UNDERSTANDING, ASSESSING, AND RESPOND-
ING TO TERRORISM: PROTECTING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND PERSONNEL 
app. 2.2, at 88–99 (2007) (defining critical infrastructures as ―those physical 
and cyber-based systems essential to the minimum operations of the economy 
and government‖).  
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a class or collection of similar cyber security activities by a Federal 
agency that involves personally identifiable data that is— 
  (A) screened by a cyber security system outside of the Federal 
agency . . . 
  (B) transferred, for the purpose of cyber security, outside such 
Federal Agency; or  
  (C) transferred, for the purpose of cyber security, to an element of 
the intelligence community.39 
The Act conceives of cybersecurity not only broadly—it 
could include the Federal Trade Commission‘s anti-spam ef-
forts, for example—but recursively.40 The Protecting Cyber-
space as a National Asset Act of 2010 defines ―information se-
curity‖ as ―protecting information and information systems 
from disruption or unauthorized access, use, disclosure, modifi-
cation, or destruction in order to provide‖ integrity, confiden-
tiality, and availability.41 The Homeland Security Cyber and 
Physical Infrastructure Protection Act of 2011 proposes cyber-
security requirements that cover ―an occurrence that jeopardiz-
es the security of data or the physical security of a computer 
network owned or operated by a Federal agency or covered crit-
ical infrastructure,‖42 where critical infrastructure includes 
private sector computer systems identified by the Department 
of Homeland Security.43 In short, for government policymakers, 
there is little that cybersecurity does not cover. 
Similarly, legal scholars define the concept expansively. 
Gus P. Coldebella and Brian M. White see cybersecurity as en-
compassing ―criminality of all stripes, nation state and corpo-
rate espionage, and attack[s],‖ even while they decry term-
creep in the concept.44 Sean M. Condron, of the U.S. Army‘s 
Judge Advocate General‘s Legal Center and School,45 defines 
 
 39. National Cyber Infrastructure Protection Act of 2010, S. 3538, 111th 
Cong. § 2(3) (2010), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-111s3538is/ 
pdf/BILLS-111s3538is.pdf. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Protecting Cyberspace as a National Asset Act of 2010, S. 3480, 111th 
Cong. § 3(9) (2010), available at http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/index.cfm? 
FuseAction=Files.View&FileStore_id=4ee63497-ca5b-4a4b-9bba-04b7f4cb0123. 
 42. Homeland Security Cyber and Physical Infrastructure Protection Act 
of 2011, H.R. 174, 112th Cong. § 221(3) (2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/ 
fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112hr174ih/pdf/BILLS-112hr174ih.pdf. 
 43. Id. §§ 221(2), 224(e). 
 44. Gus P. Coldebella & Brian M. White, Foundational Questions Regard-
ing the Federal Role in Cybersecurity, 4 J. NAT‘L SECURITY L. & POL‘Y 233, 
235–36 (2010). 
 45. Sean M. Condron, Getting It Right: Protecting American Critical In-
frastructure in Cyberspace, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 403, 403 (2007). 
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the problem as attacks on critical infrastructure by ―terrorists, 
nation-states, terrorist sympathizers, and thrill seekers,‖46 
where critical infrastructure comprises networked computer 
systems ―so vital to the United States that the incapacity or de-
struction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating 
impact on security, national economic security, national public 
health or safety, or any combination of those matters.‖47 Susan 
Brenner, in her Article classifying cybersecurity risks based on 
the actor‘s intent, defines cyberthreats as those ―using comput-
er technology to engage in activity that undermines a society‘s 
ability to maintain internal or external order.‖48 Milton L. 
Mueller decries the fact that ―the term security now encom-
passes a host of problems, perhaps too many to fit properly un-
der one word.‖49 However, he then proposes a governance-based 
approach to cybersecurity without offering a coherent definition 
of the term, and includes spam, phishing, and surveillance as 
representative threats.50 
Even scholars who purportedly focus on narrower aspects 
of cybersecurity employ commodious definitions. Kelly Gable, 
who concentrates on cyberterrorism, defines it as ―efforts by 
terrorists to use the Internet to hijack computer systems, bring 
down the international finance system, or commit analogous 
terrorist actions in cyberspace.‖51 A 2001 report by Steven A. 
Hildreth of the Congressional Research Service describes cy-
berwarfare as ―various aspects of defending and attacking in-
formation and computer networks in cyberspace, as well as de-
nying an adversary‘s ability to do the same.‖52 Brenner defines 
cybercrime as ―the use of computer technology to commit crime; 
to engage in activity that threatens a society‘s ability to main-
tain internal order.‖53 Richard Clarke, former Special Advisor 
on Cybersecurity to President George W. Bush, and co-author 
Robert Knake even conceive of cybersecurity as encompassing 
 
 46. Id. at 404 (citing Michael A. Vatis, Cyber Attacks During the War on 
Terrorism: A Predictive Analysis, INST. FOR SECURITY TECH. STUD. AT DART-
MOUTH C., 1 (2001), http://www.ists.dartmouth.edu/docs /cyber_a1.pdf ). 
 47. Id. at 406 (adopting definition from 42 U.S.C. § 5195c(e) (2006)). 
 48. Brenner, supra note 17, at 381. 
 49. MUELLER, supra note 27, at 159. 
 50. Id. at 165–79. 
 51. Gable, supra note 19, at 62. 
 52. STEVEN A. HILDRETH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL3073, CYBERWAR-
FARE, Summary (2001), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL30735.pdf. 
 53. Brenner, supra note 17, at 386. 
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intellectual property theft.54 These definitions of cybersecurity 
are vague, overbroad, and not helpful. Each attempt at framing 
the cybersecurity problem implicitly sets a standard for ad-
dressing the problem, for prioritizing it relative to competing 
concerns, and for measuring progress. Inaccurate cybersecurity 
definitions impede these efforts. 
Conceptual failures—shortcomings in theoretical orienta-
tion—are largely to blame for what all commentators agree is 
an utter lack of success in improving cybersecurity.55 Legal 
scholarship has thus far approached cybersecurity questions 
from within well-established, comfortable, yet poorly fitting 
models from criminal law, national security law, and military 
law. These doctrinal frameworks push scholars to concentrate 
upon the identity of actors behind a cyberthreat, and to deter-
mine their intent.56 The problem is that the Internet‘s design 
makes attribution extremely difficult.57 Tracing an attack to a 
given computer is challenging; deciphering who operated that 
computer during the attack is harder yet; and discerning mo-
tive can be nearly impossible.58 The chief culprit, for most  
 
 54. CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 23, at 236–37. 
 55. See, e.g., NAT‘L RESEARCH COUNCIL, TOWARD A SAFER AND MORE SE-
CURE CYBERSPACE 9–10 (Seymour E. Goodman & Herbert S. Lin eds., 2007) 
(―After more than 15 years of reports pointing to an ominous threat, and in 
fact more than 15 years in which the threat has objectively grown, why is 
there not a national sense of urgency about cybersecurity? Why has action not 
been taken to close the gap between the nation‘s cybersecurity posture and the 
cyberthreat?‖). 
 56. See, e.g., Brenner, supra note 17, at 438–40 (discussing the implica-
tions of the difficulty of discerning motivations for some cyberattacks); Dycus, 
supra note 22 (noting the difficulty of identifying the source of a cyberattack); 
Gable, supra note 19, at 105 (arguing for universal jurisdiction for cyberat-
tacks based on the common motivations of ―political, religious, or ideological 
causes‖). 
 57. See, e.g., CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 23, at 214–15, 248 (detailing 
the troubles that computer forensics experts have in tracing the sources of cy-
berattacks and the further problem that, even if forensics could trace an at-
tack to a nation-state, the leaders could claim that an anonymous citizen car-
ried it out); NAT‘L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 55, at 46, 49 (discussing 
how high-level cyberattackers could conceal their identities); Gable, supra note 
19, at 100–02 (describing the technological difficulties of tracking a cyberat-
tack over the Internet); Jensen, supra note 24 (explaining how the relative 
anonymity of IP addresses affords attackers, especially foreign governments, 
―plausible deniability‖). 
 58. Attribution must identify both the computer and the operator in-
volved. See, e.g., CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 23, at 214–15 (explaining why 
simply knowing the computer network in which an attack originates is not suf-
ficient to attribute the attack to a particular actor). Many security-
compromised computers are part of botnets, which are ―network[s] of comput-
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scholars, is the lack of an authentication mechanism in the In-
ternet‘s core TCP/IP protocols.59 The Internet routes data in 
best-efforts fashion, regardless of who sent it.60 Indeed, there is 
simply no way to verify a sender‘s identity under TCP/IP; func-
tions such as authentication and error-checking are left to 
higher-level network layers and applications.61 This default 
setting, which permits unattributed communication, is fre-
quently exploited by malefactors—Internet traffic can be gen-
erated by botnets of suborned computers available for rent, or 
from computers specifically compromised for purposes of an at-
tack.62  
Recent cybersecurity incidents illustrate the problem. The 
cyberassault on Estonia during that country‘s conflict with 
Russia in May 2007 originated in part from computers located 
in Brazil and Vietnam.63 The July 2009 denial of service attack 
against South Korea and the U.S., widely attributed to North 
 
ers that have been forced to operate on the commands of an unauthorized re-
mote user, usually without the knowledge of their owners or operators.‖ Id. at 
282. The malicious programs used to create botnets (―bots‖ or ―robots‖) are ex-
tremely difficult to detect; hence, the actor may be unaware of the malicious 
manner in which her computer is actually functioning. BERNADETTE SCHELL & 
CLEMENS MARTIN, WEBSTER‘S NEW WORLD HACKER DICTIONARY 42 (2006). 
 59. See, e.g., Chris Chambers et al., TCP/IP Security, LINUXSECURI-
TY.COM, § 3.2, http://www.linuxsecurity.com/resource_files/documentation/tcpip 
-security.html ( last visited Nov. 7, 2011) (―The utter lack of authentication 
with IP packets is a general weakness with TCP/IP. Without authentication, 
there really is no guarantee that a packet comes from where its source field 
claims it comes from. This is . . . the major issue in IP security.‖). See generally 
Request for Comments 1122: Requirements for Internet Hosts—Communication 
Layers, INTERNET ENG. TASK FORCE (R. Braden ed., Oct. 1989), http:// 
tools.ietf.org/pdf/rfc1122.pdf (defining Transmission Control Protocol [TCP] 
and Internet Protocol [ IP]). 
 60. E.g., JEAN WALRAND & SHYAM PAREKH, COMMUNICATION NETWORKS: 
A CONCISE INTRODUCTION 18–19 (2010). 
 61. See, e.g., 1 INFORMATION SECURITY MANAGEMENT HANDBOOK 114 
(Harold F. Tipton & Micki Krause eds., 5th ed. 2004) (describing higher-level 
network layers and applications used to make Internet connections more  
secure). 
 62. NAT‘L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 55, at 115–16; Derek E. Bam-
bauer & Oliver Day, The Hacker‘s Aegis, 60 EMORY L.J. 1051, 1058–59, 1067 
(2011). See generally Info. Warfare Monitor & Shadowserver Found., Shadows 
in the Cloud: Investigating Cyber Espionage 2.0, SCRIBD (Apr. 6, 2010) [here-
inafter Shadows in the Cloud], http://www.shadows-in-the-cloud.net (docu-
menting GhostNet cyberespionage malware). 
 63. SUSAN W. BRENNER, CYBERTHREATS 133–34 (2009); Mark Landler & 
John Markoff, After Computer Siege in Estonia, War Fears Turn to Cyberspace, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2007, at A1. 
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Korea,64 was launched from computers in Austria, Georgia, 
Germany, and even South Korea and America.65 In both cases, 
initial judgments that a State (Russia or North Korea) was re-
sponsible dissolved into uncertainty in the face of mixed evi-
dence. Attribution is thus an intolerably hard problem for con-
ventional legal approaches. Worse, it is one that flows directly 
from the architecture of the Internet.66 
Unsurprisingly, the predominant answer to this perceived 
shortcoming is to retrofit attribution capabilities into the core 
of the Internet. Clarke and Knake want to move to new net-
works where ―the user‘s authenticated identity could be em-
bedded in each packet.‖67 Jeffrey A. Hunker too believes that 
the ―existing Internet architecture is fundamentally inse-
cure.‖68 He seeks to replace the Internet with a network that 
allows ―different governments to have different rules,‖ where 
governments ―protect their citizens on the Internet the same 
way they protect them‖ in other media.69 Former Director of 
National Intelligence Mike McConnell argues ―we need to reen-
gineer the Internet to make attribution, geolocation, intelli-
gence analysis and impact assessment . . . more manageable.‖70 
Former CIA Director Michael V. Hayden proposes creating a 
new, ―hardened enterprise structure‖ for the Internet that 
 
 64. Pentagon Official: North Korea Behind Week of Cyber Attacks, FOX-
NEWS.COM (July 9, 2009), http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,530781,00.html. 
But see Lolita C. Baldor, US Largely Ruling Out North Korea in 2009 Cyber 
Attacks, USATODAY (July 6, 2010, 11:45 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/tech/ 
news/computersecurity/2010-07-06-nkorea-cyber-attacks_N.htm (stating that 
U.S. government experts had ―largely ruled out‖ North Korea as the source of 
the attacks). 
 65. D.J. Walker-Morgan, DDoS Attacks with Zombie Computers—‗North 
Korea‘s Powerful Hacker Army‘?, THE H SECURITY (July 10, 2009, 1:49 PM), 
http://www.h-online.com/security/news/item/DDoS-attacks-with-zombie-computers 
-North-Korea-s-powerful-hacker-army-742435.html. 
 66. See, e.g., CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 23, at 214–15 (discussing how 
the structure of the Internet makes attribution of cyberattacks difficult); Ga-
ble, supra note 19, at 84 (stating ―[a]s a result of the inherent insecurity of the 
TCP/IP Protocol, . . . it is remarkably easy to attack any network that is based 
on that protocol,‖ including the Internet). 
 67. CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 23, at 275. 
 68. Hunker, supra note 14, at 207. 
 69. Id. (quoting Raj Jain, Internet 3.0: Ten Problems with Current Internet 
Architecture and Solutions for the Next Generation, WASH. U. ST. LOUIS, 
http://www.cse.wustl.edu/~jain/papers/ftp/gina.pdf ( last visited Nov. 7, 2011)). 
 70. Mike McConnell, To Win the Cyber-War, Look to the Cold War, WASH. 
POST, Feb. 28, 2010, at B1. 
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would embed identification capabilities into its architecture.71 
Stuart Biegel states that ―code-based adjustments in Internet 
architecture . . . can go a long way toward countering cyberter-
rorism.‖72 Greater attribution enables the traditional practice 
of deterrence, along with traditional distinctions among crimi-
nals, terrorists, soldiers, and spies.73 By building strong attri-
bution into networking protocols, lawyers (and their govern-
ments) can apply time-tested ways of thinking and reacting to 
threats online. However, trying to redesign the architecture of 
the Internet as a solution has at least three critical shortcom-
ings: difficult implementation, unintended consequences, and 
loss of generativity. 
A. IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES AND NETWORK EFFECTS 
First, effecting a change to core Internet protocols would be 
extremely difficult. The Internet‘s success and ubiquity rest 
largely on the role of TCP/IP as the lingua franca for informa-
tion exchange.74 Network effects drove adoption: any device us-
ing TCP/IP that attaches to the Internet can immediately 
communicate with every other point on the Net.75 Changing 
TCP/IP would require altering each of those devices‘ network-
ing stacks—no small task when there are over 845 million 
hosts directly connected to the Internet.76 Moreover, key stake-
 
 71. Aliya Sternstein, Former CIA Director: Build a New Internet to Im-
prove Cybersecurity, NEXTGOV (July 6, 2011), http://www.nextgov.com/nextgov/ 
ng_20110706_1137.php?oref=topnews. 
 72. STUART BIEGEL, BEYOND OUR CONTROL?: CONFRONTING THE LIMITS 
OF OUR LEGAL SYSTEM IN THE AGE OF CYBERSPACE 256–57 (2003). 
 73. See, e.g., NATIONAL STRATEGY TO SECURE CYBERSPACE, supra note 17, 
at 113–18 (discussing how more accurate attribution on the Internet can foster 
accountability for cyberattacks); Brenner, supra note 17, at 404, 438 (discuss-
ing how attribution problems make it difficult to differentiate between crime, 
terrorism, and war during cyberattacks). 
 74. See JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET—AND HOW 
TO STOP IT 60, 67–100 (2008) (explaining that ―if the Internet had been de-
signed with security as its centerpiece, it would never have achieved the kind 
of success it was enjoying‖ and describing the ―generative pattern‖ of the In-
ternet, which is essentially the idea that the Internet‘s architecture fosters  
innovation). 
 75. See STAN J. LIEBOWITZ, RE-THINKING THE NETWORK ECONOMY 13–14 
(2002) (defining network effects as the increased benefit in using a network 
that comes with the rise in the number of other people using the network). 
 76. Internet Domain Survey, INTERNET SYS. CONSORTIUM (July 2011), 
http://ftp.isc.org/www/survey/reports/current/ (reporting 849,869,781 hosts ad-
vertised on the Domain Name System (DNS) as of July 2011). For methodolo-
gy, see The Domain Survey, INTERNET SYS. CONSORTIUM, http://ftp.isc.org/ 
www/survey/reports/current/survey.html ( last visited Nov. 7, 2011). 
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holders such as Internet Service Providers (ISPs), operating 
system vendors (particularly Microsoft), the Internet Engineer-
ing Task Force (IETF), and possibly even the Internet Corpora-
tion for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) would have to 
come to consensus, not only about the need for such a change, 
but also about the method to accomplish it.  
Consider two illustrative examples: Internet Protocol ver-
sion 6 (IPv6)77 and spam. First, network administrators have 
encountered significant delays in migrating from IPv4 to 
IPv6.78 This change should be straightforward. IPv6 is compat-
ible with IPv4, at least with certain transition mechanisms,79 
and has few controversial features (unlike attribution).80 Fur-
thermore, everyone acknowledges the shift‘s necessity81—the 
Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) distributed the 
remaining IPv4 addresses to the five regional Internet regi-
stries (RIRs) in February 2011.82 One RIR began a strict IPv4 
address delegation policy in April 2011 to postpone IPv4 ex-
 
 77. See generally S. Deering & R. Hinden, Internet Protocol, Version 6 
(IPv6) Specification (Dec. 1998), http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/pdfrfc/rfc2460.txt 
.pdf (discussing the technical details of IPv6); IPv6, MICROSOFT, http://technet 
.microsoft.com/en-us/network/bb530961 ( last visited Nov. 7, 2011) (introducing 
IPv6 and explaining its utility).  
 78. See Mónica Domingues and Carlos Friaças, Is Global IPv6 Deployment 
on Track?, 17 INTERNET RES. 505, 506 (2007) (acknowledging the slow adop-
tion of IPv6). 
 79. See Carolyn Duffy Marsan, Biggest Mistake for IPv6: It‘s Not Back-
wards Compatible, Developers Admit, NETWORK WORLD (Mar. 25, 2009, 8:23 
AM), http://www.networkworld.com/news/2009/032509-ipv6-mistake.html (not-
ing that, although IPv6 is not backwards compatible on its own, the use of 
transition mechanisms can integrate IPv6 with IPv4); see also Carolyn Duffy 
Marsan, ‗IPv6 Brokenness‘ Problem Appears Fixed, NETWORK WORLD (July 27, 
2011, 3:08 PM), http://www.networkworld.com/news/2011/072711-ipv6-brokenness 
.html. 
 80. See Deering & Hinden, supra note 77.  
 81. See, e.g., News Release, The Internet Corp. for Assigned Names and 
Numbers (ICANN), Available Pool of Unallocated IPv4 Internet Addresses 
Now Completely Emptied 1 (Feb. 3, 2011), http://www.icann.org/en/news/ 
releases/release-03feb11-en.pdf (―[T]he future expansion of the Internet is now 
dependant on the successful global deployment of the next generation of In-
ternet protocol, called IPv6.‖). 
 82. See, e.g., id.; Geoff Huston, IPv4 Address Report, POTAROO, http://www 
.potaroo.net/tools/ipv4/index.html ( last visited Nov. 7, 2011) (continuously cal-
culating projected IPv4 address exhaustion); Antone Gonsalves, IP Addresses 
Predicted to be Exhausted In 2011, INFORMATIONWEEK (July 27, 2010), http:// 
www.informationweek.com/news/software/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=226300002. 
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haustion.83 And the remaining four RIRs are expected to ex-
haust their pools of IPv4 addresses within the next three 
years.84 Yet IPv6 deployment has been quite slow, to the con-
cern of observers such as the OECD.85 By early 2010, only 5.5% 
of Internet-connected networks could handle IPv6; only 0.25% 
of Internet users had IPv6 connectivity; and only 0.16% of the 
top million sites on the Web offered IPv6 support.86 It is diffi-
cult to make even minor changes to ubiquitous standards.87 
Next, think about spam. Everyone hates it and there is 
widespread consensus about which e-mail messages qualify as 
spam.88 Moreover, spam creates a considerable, expensive bur-
den for ISPs: it comprises nearly eighty percent of e-mail traf-
fic.89 Like cybersecurity, spam results from an attribution prob-
lem: the protocol for e-mail transfer, Simple Mail Transfer 
Protocol (SMTP), does not verify a sender‘s identity.90 Thus, one 
can readily falsify a message‘s source. Re-engineering SMTP to 
implement authentication was rejected as too difficult to dep-
loy, given the installed base of e-mail clients and servers.91 Var-
ious messaging-related entities—Microsoft, Yahoo!, the IETF—
sought to craft add-on components to deal with attribution.92 
 
 83. See Policies for IPv4 Address Space Management in the Asia Pacific 
Region, ASIA-PAC. NETWORK INFO. CTR. (May 9, 2011), http://www.apnic.net/ 
policy/add-manage-policy. 
 84. Huston, supra note 82. 
 85. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., INTERNET ADDRESSING: 
MEASURING DEPLOYMENT OF IPV6 40–42 (2010), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/48/51/44953210.pdf (noting the critical situation 
of IPv4 exhaustion and urging for governmental and international cooperation 
in transitioning to IPv6). 
 86. Id. at 4–5. 
 87. See LAURA DENARDIS, PROTOCOL POLITICS: THE GLOBALIZATION OF 
INTERNET GOVERNANCE 225–28 (2009). 
 88. See DEREK E. BAMBAUER ET AL., INT‘L TELECOMM. UNION, A COMPAR-
ATIVE ANALYSIS OF SPAM LAWS: THE QUEST FOR MODEL LAW 26–27 (2005), 
available at http://www.itu.int/osg/spu/cybersecurity/docs/Background_Paper_ 
Comparative_Analysis_of_Spam_Laws.pdf. 
 89. Mathew J. Schwartz, Spam Plummets to 2009 Levels, INFO.WEEK 
(Jan. 26, 2011, 1:38 PM), http://www.informationweek.com/news/security/ 
management/229100295?cid=RSSfeed_IWK_News. 
 90. See Derek E. Bambauer, Solving the Inbox Paradox: An Information-
Based Policy Approach to Unsolicited E-mail Advertising, 10 VA. J.L. & TECH. 
5, ¶ 14 (2005), http://www.vjolt.net/vol10/issue2/v10i2_a5-Bambauer.pdf. 
 91. Id. ¶ 17 & nn.52–53. 
 92. Id. ¶¶ 34–44. 
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Efforts to combine the resulting schemes failed,93 and anti-
spam technologies remain fragmented. Network effects, and 
competition to define how attribution would work, defeated 
protocol changes that might have greatly reduced spam.94 
As spam and IPv6 demonstrate, even widespread consen-
sus on a problem created by shortcomings in core Internet pro-
tocols, and on the need for a technological solution, may not re-
sult in a fix. 
B. ATTRIBUTION‘S UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES 
The second shortcoming to re-designing the architecture of 
the Internet is that attribution is not an unalloyed good and 
would have unintended consequences. An authenticated Inter-
net would be one with both fewer viruses and less dissent. It 
would change who can communicate, how free they feel to do 
so, and the ways in which that information exchange is gov-
erned. China, for example, has moved steadily to force users to 
employ their real names online.95 Indeed, part of China‘s push 
to deploy IPv6 is the country‘s desire to increase attribution 
and accountability online.96 With a sufficient number of IP ad-
dresses, China could allocate a single permanent address to 
each Internet-connected device, and seek to trace data to that 
source. Enhancing attribution means facing hard tradeoffs: not 
only between values such as security and free expression, but 
between different users. American users might benefit from au-
thentication, since their ability to engage in free expression (in-
cluding anonymously) is protected through law,97 while Chinese 
users might suffer, since their government actively impedes 
communication on certain topics.98 China‘s government itself 
 
 93. Jim Wagner, IETF Shutters E-mail Working Group, INTERNET-
NEWS.COM (Sept. 22, 2004), http://www.internetnews.com/bus-news/article.php/ 
3411461/IETF+Shutters+Email+Working+Group.htm. 
 94. See Bambauer, supra note 90, ¶¶ 43–47. 
 95. See ACCESS CONTROLLED: THE SHAPING OF POWER RIGHTS, AND RULE 
IN CYBERSPACE 464–65 (Ronald Deibert et al. eds., 2010) [hereinafter ACCESS 
CONTROLLED]; Peter Foster, China to Force Internet Users to Register Real 
Names, The TELEGRAPH (May 5, 2010, 12:40 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/ 
news/worldnews/asia/china/7681709/China-to-force-internet-users-to-register-real 
-names.html.  
 96. Rana Foroohar & Melinda Liu, It‘s China‘s World We‘re Just Living in 
It, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 22, 2010, at 36, 38. 
 97. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm‘n, 514 U.S. 334, 342 (1995). 
 98. See ACCESS CONTROLLED, supra note 95, at 449–87 (documenting 
China‘s employment of sophisticated online filtering and surveillance systems 
to suppress free speech). 
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might be conflicted: attribution could augment its internal se-
curity controls, but weaken its capabilities to mount a deniable 
cyberattack. Embedding attribution in the Internet‘s core is not 
merely a technical change: it is a choice among competing nor-
mative models of how the network should function, and who 
should benefit.99 
C. FORFEITING GENERATIVITY 
The third shortcoming is that greater security through 
code may damage the Internet‘s generativity. It is likely to al-
ter the Internet‘s power as a platform for technological innova-
tion. Jonathan Zittrain, Yochai Benkler, David G. Post, Tim 
Wu, Barbara van Schewick, and other cyberscholars make the 
powerful case that the Internet‘s value as a communications 
platform comes from its open, end-to-end architecture.100 No 
one need ask permission before creating and deploying a new 
application.101 Changing this design by replacing automatic 
routing that is identity-agnostic with authenticated communi-
cation risks destroying the Net‘s generativity. Attribution re-
quires, at minimum, that data carry an identifying signal, and 
that routing devices be designed to inspect, and make decisions 
based upon, that information. Even proponents concede this 
would slow routing.102 More importantly, it changes the Inter-
net‘s default behavior: anonymous information would go from 
being the norm to being suspect. A permission-based Internet 
could well suffer the same shortcomings as the circuit-switched 
telephone network did in spurring innovation.103 When gate-
keepers can veto changes by withholding assent—such as 
AT&T‘s objections to network-attached equipment as innocuous 
 
 99. Cf. MUELLER, supra note 27, at 180–82 (noting that ―by creating a sys-
tem of ‗identification‘ on the Internet, we are answering fundamental ques-
tions about the nature and scope of government‖). 
 100. See generally YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS (2006); 
DAVID G. POST, IN SEARCH OF JEFFERSON‘S MOOSE (2009); BARBARA VAN 
SCHEWICK, INTERNET ARCHITECTURE AND INNOVATION (2010); ZITTRAIN, su-
pra note 74 passim; J.H. Saltzer et al., End-to-End Arguments in System De-
sign, 2 ACM TRANSACTIONS ON COMPUTER SYS. 277 (1984); Tim Wu & Chris-
topher Yoo, Keeping the Internet Neutral?: Tim Wu and Christopher Yoo 
Debate, 59 FED. COMM. L.J. 575 (2007). 
 101. See Zittrain, supra note 29. 
 102. CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 23, at 161. 
 103. See Wu & Yoo, supra note 100, at 577–78, 581–83. 
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as a rubber mouthpiece designed to make conversations more 
private104—they often do, either out of caution or self-interest.  
Changing the Internet‘s architecture to enable attribution 
is attractive to scholars who need this capability to employ 
standard doctrinal models for cybersecurity. However, they fail 
to consider the countervailing risks of deployment challenges, 
unintended consequences, and loss of generativity. Their pro-
posals to save the Internet could destroy it.  
Wide-ranging governmental policies and scholarly efforts 
to cram cybersecurity into existing models of thinking reflect 
not only comfort with the familiar, but a response to wide-
spread near-panic over a looming cyber-apocalypse.105 The next 
Part examines these fears and why they are likely overblown. 
II.  APOCALYPSE NOW?   
Within a quarter of an hour, 157 major metropolitan areas have been 
thrown into knots by a nationwide power blackout hitting during rush 
hour. Poison gas clouds are wafting toward Wilmington and Houston. 
Refineries are burning up oil supplies in several cities. Subways have 
crashed in New York, Oakland, Washington, and Los Angeles. 
Freight trains have derailed outside major junctions and marshaling 
yards on four major railroads. Aircraft are literally falling out of the 
sky as a result of midair collisions across the country. Pipelines carry-
ing natural gas to the Northeast have exploded, leaving millions in 
the cold. The financial system has frozen solid because of terabytes of 
information at data centers being wiped out.106 
A. RAGNAROK 
Cyberspace is falling—if not now, then soon. Policymakers 
are fearful. The National Research Council of the National 
Academies warns of a ―digital Pearl Harbor.‖107 Former coun-
terterrorism coordinator Richard Clarke describes the risk of ―a 
massive cyberattack on civilian infrastructure that smacks 
down power grids for weeks, halts trains, grounds aircraft, ex-
plodes pipelines, and sets fires to refineries.‖108 Senator Harry 
 
 104. See Hush-A-Phone v. United States, 238 F.2d 266, 267–68 (D.C. Cir. 
1956) (noting that intervenors, including AT&T, filed tariffs with the FCC for-
bidding the attachment of petitioner‘s device to intervenors‘ telephones, even 
though the device ―[did] not impair any of the facilities of the telephone  
companies‖). 
 105. See Jonathan Zittrain, The Fourth Quadrant, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2767, 2776 (2010) (―[T]here is rising panic over the situation.‖). 
 106. CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 23, at 67. 
 107. NAT‘L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 55, at 50. 
 108. CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 23, at 260. 
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M. Reid stated that ―Cyber attack could, for example, bring 
down our nation‘s air traffic control system in a matter of 
seconds‖;109 Senator Joseph I. Lieberman agreed that the ―fu-
ture security of the American way of life depends on passage of 
comprehensive cyber security legislation.‖110 
Scholars and technologists also view the situation in cata-
strophic terms. Kelly Gable writes of a ―cyber-apocalypse,‖ 
where ―Al Qaeda replace[s] the White House website with a 
message that they have hacked into and shut down [cities‘] ma-
jor power grids to cripple the U.S. economy . . . .‖111 The chief 
security officer for Oracle warned of terrorist attacks on critical 
infrastructure, saying, ―‗[M]ove the control rods in and out of 
the reactor? There‘s an app for that.‘‖112 Former Direct of Na-
tional Intelligence Mike McConnell states that a large-scale cy-
berattack on the U.S. could have global economic effects on ―‗an 
order of magnitude surpassing‘ the [terrorist] attacks of Sep-
tember 11 [2001].‖113 Analyst Franz-Stefan Gady writes of the 
risk that a botnet based in Africa could ―bring down the world‘s 
top 10 leading economies with just a few strokes.‖114 President 
Obama‘s Cyberspace Policy Review summarizes the consensus 
viewpoint, describing the lack of cybersecurity as ―[o]ne of the 
most serious economic and national security threats of the 21st 
Century for the United States.‖115  
These descriptions are alarmist, and inaccurate.116 Overes-
timating risks from the Internet, hackers, and software vulner-
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abilities is common—Paul Ohm refers to the ―myth of the supe-
ruser.‖117 They are also not accidental. Increasing the attention 
and funding devoted to cybersecurity will benefit important in-
terests, from the software security community,118 to agencies 
like the Department of Homeland Security,119 to policy think 
tanks.120 Regulatory competition among federal government 
agencies has been a recurring theme in Internet security ef-
forts.121 Downplaying risks is not an effective way to gain au-
thority (and a budget) to combat them. Some cybersecurity 
commentators also have potential conflicts of interest. Richard 
Clarke now operates a consulting firm that offers cybersecurity 
risk consulting.122 Stewart A. Baker, former Assistance Secre-
tary for Policy at DHS, who worries about ―freezing in the dark 
because of cyberweapons,‖123 is a partner at the law firm of 
Steptoe & Johnson, with a practice covering national security 
and technology.124 Mike McConnell rejoined the consulting firm 
Booz Allen Hamilton as leader of its Intelligence business; the 
firm recently received $34 million in government contracts for 
cybersecurity.125 This is not to suggest bad faith on the part of 
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these groups or individuals, but rather to state that they have 
incentives to convey a compelling image of dramatic cyberse-
curity threats.  
Even fakery may generate overblown claims. Guerrilla 
marketing firm The Brainstormclub created a viral video os-
tensibly showing hackers taking control of the lighting in two 
skyscrapers to play a colossal game of Space Invaders.126 A 
McAfee Avert Labs researcher wrote that ―[p]erhaps the first 
demo was just for fun, but the others will have less juvenile 
goals . . . . An attack can involve nationwide damage . . . .‖127 
The video, though, was fiction. Although computers created the 
giant Space Invaders match, they were Brainstormclub‘s 
graphic production ones, not the Supervisory Control and Data 
Acquisition (SCADA) systems in the buildings.128 Nonetheless, 
McAfee‘s blogger asserted, ―fake or not, the video confirms that 
hackers and cybercriminals have got their eyes on SCADA 
networks.‖129 Perhaps this is because ―McAfee‘s recent acquisi-
tion of Solidcore will help [its] customers‖ secure SCADA sys-
tems against cyberattack, or at least rogue marketers.130  
Scholars and commentators describe cyberthreats in dra-
matic, even cataclysmic, terms. These fears have generated a 
regulatory stampede, though proposals to date have not only 
failed to define the extent of the problem, but also to craft a co-
herent solution. 
B. REACTION 
Florid descriptions of imminent, catastrophic risk in cyber-
space have produced a rush to regulate cybersecurity.131 In-
deed, in the summer of 2010, an election year, over twenty cy-
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bersecurity bills were pending in Congress.132 Regulatory pro-
posals to prevent the fall of cyberspace tend to suffer similar 
shortcomings. They fail to describe precisely the cybersecurity 
problem which is to be solved, and thereby put forward meas-
ures that are either too small or too great in coverage. Pur-
ported reforms are often parochial: they focus on shuffling au-
thority for security among government agencies, or between 
branches of government. And some proposals are simply stupid: 
Stewart Baker believes that users should have to obtain an ―In-
ternet driver‘s license‖ before being permitted online,133 and 
Jeffrey Carr, unintentionally copying China‘s approach,134 
seeks to compel ISPs to verify their customers‘ real identi-
ties.135 This Section reviews recent cybersecurity efforts, and 
their failings. 
To date, proposals to use law to improve cybersecurity have 
been strikingly minimalist (particularly when compared to the 
apocalyptic rhetoric used to describe the problem), or, on occa-
sion, incredibly broad. In the minimalist camp, President Ob-
ama‘s administration has advanced policies that are highly  
deferential in regulating entities such as Internet service pro-
viders, equipment manufacturers, and utility operators. Ob-
ama‘s sixty-day Cybersecurity Policy Review emphasizes pub-
lic-private partnerships, information sharing, financial 
incentives through procurement strategy and tax benefits, and 
investment in research.136 Regulatory mandates, such as re-
quiring private entities to share information with government 
cybersecurity officials, are expressly a ―last resort.‖137 Clarke 
and Knake note that Obama ―went out of his way to take regu-
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lation off the table.‖138 For example, Howard Schmidt, the ad-
ministration‘s coordinator for cybersecurity, endorsed manda-
tory encryption for Internet communication by firms in the 
electrical and power industries.139 However, President Obama 
refused to support Schmidt‘s recommendation, citing financial 
and logistical costs for affected corporations.140 Even the ad-
ministration‘s identity management initiative, which addresses 
attribution problems widely viewed as central to cybersecurity, 
is a voluntary program that contemplates multiple vendors and 
optional adoption.141 Many congressional proposals have been 
equally small-scale,142 focusing on which executive agency 
should lead cybersecurity efforts (typically devolving into a con-
test between the Department of Defense and the Department of 
Homeland Security),143 establishing a consortium to train state 
and local first responders,144 or setting priorities for research 
and development funding.145 In short, where cybersecurity is 
concerned, the Obama administration and Congress are usually 
chary of legal mandates. (Contrast this reluctance, though, 
with the administration‘s willingness to regulate the design of 
Internet applications to enable eavesdropping,146 and to ensure 
that ISPs retain data to aid law enforcement.147). 
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Minimalist approaches contemplate a minor role for gov-
ernment in cybersecurity, with considerable deference to pri-
vate sector efforts and standards. This reticence is in tension 
with apocalyptic views of cyberthreats, as threats to national 
well-being typically involve significant government mandates. 
(The federal takeover of airport security in the wake of the ter-
rorist attacks of September 11, 2001 is but one example.)148 
However, deference is widely favored. Gregory T. Nojeim, se-
nior counsel for the Center for Democracy & Technology, who 
worries about civil liberties, argues that ―[c]ybersecurity solu-
tions that favor industry standards over government technolo-
gy mandates will enhance security more efficiently and flexibly 
than those that do not.‖149 Coldebella and White state that 
―owners of critical infrastructure have had the incentive to de-
velop cybersecurity measures that are suited to their business-
es,‖ and thus any ―centrally planned, one-size-fits-all regulatory 
scheme would almost certainly eliminate useful, industry-
developed security measures and replace them with an ill-
fitting, nondynamic slate of requirements.‖150 There is a persis-
tent reluctance to second-guess private sector cybersecurity de-
cisions. 
The proposed legislation garnering the most attention, 
however, is the infamous ―kill switch‖ bill, which demonstrates 
cybersecurity law at its most grandiose. Senators Joseph Lie-
berman and Susan Collins introduced a wide-ranging bill that 
would increase funding for implementing security measures, 
bolster information sharing between the public and private sec-
tors, create security standards for federal agencies, and—most 
controversially—confer broad emergency powers on the U.S. 
President to protect critical infrastructure.151 The legislation 
would enable the President, when confronted with a cyber-
emergency, to compel owners and operators of critical infra-
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structure to implement emergency plans, including stopping 
data flow.152 The bill received widespread criticism,153 particu-
larly after the government of Egypt ordered that country‘s ma-
jor ISPs to cease routing data during anti-government protests 
in early 2011.154 The underlying concept of the legislation—to 
allow America to ―pull up the drawbridge‖ in case of a cyberat-
tack—is one supported by commentators such as Clarke and 
Knake.155 It plainly involves substantial augmentation of the 
government‘s control over private Internet infrastructure, al-
though proponents contend the President has similar authority 
under the Communications Act of 1934.156 The ―kill switch‖ leg-
islation runs counter to the trend of minimalist proposals for 
legal regulation of cybersecurity, which accounts in part for the 
heated opposition to the bill.157 
The Lieberman-Collins bill, even if passed and signed into 
law, is unlikely to advance cybersecurity much, for three rea-
sons. First, the bill is redundant: it is inconceivable that a net-
work that was the source or conduit of cyberattacks would 
refuse to deal with the problem, or to cooperate with govern-
ment efforts to do so.158 Any provider sufficiently removed from 
American suasive pressures would likely also be immune from 
legal enforcement. Second, disconnecting networks is as likely 
to worsen the effects of a cybersecurity problem as to ameli-
orate them. Shutting down ISPs burdens legitimate uses at the 
same time it counteracts illegitimate ones. From an informa-
tion perspective, reducing connectivity decreases authorized 
access to information, while also cutting the number of targets 
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for an attacker. Third, if the model for disconnection follows 
Clark and Knake‘s ―drawbridge‖ metaphor, where the key to 
mitigating an attack is to break contact with the wider Inter-
net, then the kill switch will fail. Any serious cyberthreat 
would be launched from networks within the U.S. as well as (or 
instead of) outside it. Indeed, the cyberattacks against South 
Korea emanated in part from computers within that country.159 
The Stuxnet cyberweapon was introduced into Iran‘s computers 
from within that state.160 Even Clarke and Knake admit that 
attacks would be launched from domestic networks as well as 
foreign ones.161 It is useless to raise the drawbridge when the 
attackers are inside the castle. Thus, legal efforts to date, 
whether cautious or outsized, hold little promise of increasing 
cybersecurity. 
Joint public-private efforts to date have focused primarily 
on encouraging private sector entities to increase their security, 
and to share data with the federal government. There is con-
sensus, though, that information sharing has noticeably 
failed.162 Owners of critical infrastructure have been reluctant 
to share information on intrusions and other cyberthreats. Ex-
planations for this unwillingness include ―fear [of] enforcement 
actions by regulators, suits by plaintiffs‘ lawyers, and criticism 
associated with public disclosure of security failures,‖163 along 
with concerns about censure from civil liberties advocates.164 
(The latter worry is entirely plausible; Nojeim argues that rou-
tine information sharing between providers and the govern-
ment would be unlawful.)165 Commentators have suggested re-
medying the shortcomings of suasive, norms-based models of 
information exchange by reshaping incentives through legisla-
tion. Thus, Coldebella and White suggest using law to eradicate 
the ―structural disincentives‖ that, in their view, impede shar-
ing vulnerability and incident data with other industry entities 
and with the government.166 It is not clear, however, why the 
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multiple existing protections for confidential reporting by the 
private sector to government actors are inadequate.167  
Both government and private sector cybersecurity propos-
als typically involve using code to fight code. For example, the 
Department of Homeland Security has moved to implement its 
Einstein 3 program, which will monitor the networks of critical 
infrastructure operators in realtime.168 Similarly, the National 
Security Agency is reportedly deploying sensors to monitor 
networks of critical infrastructure providers under a program 
called, in Orwellian fashion, ―Perfect Citizen,‖169 although the 
NSA claims the system is only a vulnerability assessment 
tool.170 Clarke and Knake propose that Internet users be re-
quired to use anti-virus programs on their computers,171 and 
the vice president of Microsoft‘s Trustworthy Computing Group 
thinks consumers ought to have to produce an electronic 
―health certificate‖ before interacting with critical data on-
line.172 And, as previously described, proposals to alter the In-
ternet‘s protocols to enable attribution have proliferated. The 
scope of code-based solutions, and who is responsible for deter-
mining that scope, remains a contested issue. 
Existing proposals to address cybersecurity are rooted in 
dated theoretical approaches that are poorly suited to the is-
sue‘s challenges. They range between highly radical, such as 
suggestions to give the U.S. President power to disconnect from 
the wider Internet, to painfully minimalist, such as bills that 
move cybersecurity responsibility among federal agencies like a 
shell game. These alleged reforms are reacting to a threat that 
is perceived to be immediate and grave. As the next Section de-
scribes, though, this perception is fundamentally flawed. 
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C. REALITY 
The Internet is designed for exactly the challenge that cy-
berattacks produce: disruption to segments of the network that 
force re-routing of data, with the concomitant risk of lost infor-
mation.173 Moreover, there is good indirect evidence to believe 
that apocalyptic descriptions of cyberthreats are overdrawn. 
Accidents and natural disasters mimic the effects of deliberate 
disruption of Internet traffic. For example, undersea fiber-optic 
cables, which route much of the world‘s Internet data,174 are 
routinely damaged or severed by events such as typhoons175 
and hurricanes.176 Short-term effects can be significant: an 
earthquake in Taiwan in December 2006 cut four major fiber-
optic cables, disrupting traffic moving east from Asia.177 Tai-
wan‘s largest telecommunications company reported that nine-
ty-eight percent of communication to Hong Kong, Malaysia, 
Singapore, and Thailand was taken offline.178 When two under-
sea cables in the Mediterranean Sea were cut simultaneously 
in 2008, many Internet users in the Middle East and Asia were 
forced offline, including an estimated sixty percent of India‘s 
web services.179 This example is particularly applicable, as af-
fected network providers anticipated damage to only one cable 
at a time and employed the second cable as a precaution.180 
Damage to both cables more closely approximates the effects of 
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a deliberate attack on the network. Similarly, the only fiber-
optic cable running to West Africa was damaged in July 2009, 
causing significant impairment to Internet usage in Nigeria 
(which suffered loss of approximately seventy percent of its 
bandwidth), Togo, and Niger.181 The March 2011 earthquake 
near Japan damaged undersea telecommunications cables and 
their associated routers, affecting Internet traffic in Asia.182 
The effects from these outages are similar to those of a cyberat-
tack—indeed, there was speculation that the 2008 cable dam-
age was caused by sabotage, with even the International Tele-
communication Union advancing that theory.183 
Hurricane Katrina had even greater effects on communica-
tions in the affected area of the southeastern United States in 
2005; indeed, one researcher describes the storm as ―the equiv-
alent of a weapons of mass destruction (WMD) attack on the 
Gulf Coast.‖184 The storm destroyed or disabled most communi-
cations capabilities in the area,185 through a combination of 
physical damage (such as with cellular phone towers) and pow-
er outages (such as with landline phone service).186 SCADA sys-
tems in utilities and other critical infrastructure were similarly 
disabled.187 This multi-modal failure of critical infrastructure 
likely mimics the effects of a significant cyberattack. 
However, even with major outages, data still flows. Within 
a few days of the 2006 Taiwan cable outage, alternative data 
paths were activated, international telephone links were res-
tored, and Internet services came back on-line.188 Physical re-
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Impacts, in THREATS AT OUR THRESHOLD 191, 191 (Bert B. Tussing ed., 2006), 
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pairs to the affected cables took longer, but were completed 
within fifty days.189 Similarly, providers quickly re-routed traf-
fic during disruptions caused by the 2008 cable incidents;190 one 
Indian ISP restored service to normal levels within twenty-four 
hours.191 The SAT-3 cable in West Africa that was damaged in 
2009 was repaired within three weeks.192 While poorer coun-
tries such as Niger, which rely solely on the SAT-3 cable, were 
effectively cut off from the Internet during this period, other 
states were able to shift to (admittedly more expensive) satel-
lite links as an alternative.193 Most networks in Louisiana, 
Mississippi, and Alabama were restored to service within sev-
eral days of their initial outage, although a minority of net-
works remained persistently offline.194 Japanese networks af-
fected by the earthquake recovered quickly due to the country‘s 
―dense web of domestic and international connectivity.‖195 
Thus, while damage to Internet connectivity from disasters can 
be significant, it is also generally repaired rapidly. 
There is a second source of data to evaluate the likely ef-
fects of a cyberattack: physical attacks. For example, the attack 
on Manhattan‘s World Trade Center towers on September 11, 
2001, caused extensive damage to financial networks and data. 
The Verizon central switching office that serves most of lower 
Manhattan was damaged in the attack and in subsequent res-
cue efforts, cutting off 34,000 businesses and residences, and 
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severing 11,000 lines serving ISPs.196 Even some companies 
that had invested in redundant Internet access lost transmis-
sion capabilities because their network providers routed the 
(putatively redundant) lines through the single Verizon physi-
cal plant.197 Companies such as Hartford Financial Products 
suffered the complete physical destruction of their corporate 
headquarters and associated data center and information.198 
Yet, even with this massive physical destruction of Inter-
net capabilities, financial networks and companies returned to 
online operations rapidly. U.S. trading markets, such as the 
New York Stock Exchange, resumed normal operations six days 
after the attack.199 Verizon began restoring some services as 
early as September 14.200 Hartford Financial Products had its 
computers operating by September 14, and had moved into 
substitute offices by September 17.201 The repair work neces-
sary to restore communications was likely more extensive than 
would be required from a cyberattack, as it required not only 
resupply and routing of physical connectivity (in some cases up 
the sides of buildings), but also the reconstruction of Verizon‘s 
cable vault in the central office.202 
Internet communication is thus quite hardy, particularly in 
America. Moreover, loss of routing is commonplace, and provid-
ers have experience managing the problem. Disruptions due to 
undersea cable damage, for example, are ubiquitous, though 
they affect primarily African nations with few alternative 
routing paths.203 In the U.S., Internet-based service has proven 
to have greater resilience than other telecommunications meth-
 
 196. GAO, GAO-03-414, POTENTIAL TERRORIST ATTACKS: ADDITIONAL AC-
TIONS NEEDED TO BETTER PREPARE CRITICAL FINANCIAL MARKET PARTICI-
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ods. For example, during Hurricane Katrina and subsequent 
flooding in Louisiana in 2005, landline telephone circuits, the 
State Police radio system, and cellular phone networks all 
failed.204 One local ISP was able to maintain some Voice over 
Internet Protocol (VoIP) phone service even during the disaster, 
and the State Police used VoIP to communicate over their 
intranet (though traffic overwhelmed their network when they 
allowed unrestricted Internet use).205 Indeed, one recommenda-
tion emerging from Katrina was that local law enforcement and 
government should move to an Internet (IP-based) architecture 
for emergency communication due to its robustness and flex-
ibility.206  
The Internet‘s core design anticipates that damage may oc-
cur to component networks. Thus, data routes dynamically, 
along the best available path at that moment.207 TCP/IP does 
not guarantee packet delivery; indeed, packet loss is common, 
and is anticipated by applications that use the Internet.208 In 
short, the Internet is designed for precisely the type of threat 
that cyberattacks pose. As one telecom analyst put it, ―there 
will always be outages . . . . We are used to thinking of the In-
ternet as being a thing that goes down.‖209 While it is possible 
that a cyberattack could greatly reduce or eliminate Internet 
connectivity, it is unlikely. America in particular has robust, 
redundant connectivity to the rest of the world.  
Even deliberate attempts by major ISPs to interfere with 
traffic flow as a competitive tactic fail. For example, in March 
2008, Cogent Communications and the Swedish provider Telia-
Sonera stopped accepting traffic from each other‘s networks 
(known as ―de-peering‖).210 Cogent claimed that TeliaSonera 
failed to provide adequate bandwidth at interconnection points, 
and TeliaSonera argued that Cogent owed it compensation for 
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carrying traffic.211 However, Swedes could still reach sites 
hosted on Cogent‘s network, and vice versa; it appears that the 
only entity made inaccessible by the dispute was Martha Stew-
art Living, and only from Sweden.212 Other ISPs carried traffic 
between the warring firms, slowing access but enabling it to 
continue. Thus, even if a cyberattack were to disrupt a major 
ISP, or its connections to a peer, Internet access would likely 
continue largely unabated. 
There is one key difference between natural disasters, and 
even some human-generated ones (such as the September 11 
terror attacks): these disruptions are not adaptive, or ongoing. 
Though responders to Katrina, 9/11, and the Asian cable 
breaks faced challenging physical and communications condi-
tions, they did not confront deliberate, changing impediments 
to their efforts.213 A major cyberattack would likely attempt to 
degrade or prevent mitigation efforts, and could include physi-
cal attacks that would make rerouting efforts more difficult or 
impossible. Thus, existing disaster examples demonstrate one-
off problems, but cannot show how Internet connectivity would 
respond to adaptive, ongoing attempts to disrupt it and to block 
repairs. Nonetheless, available data suggest that risks have 
been considerably overstated. 
Even a significant cyberattack, though, would be more li-
mited than commonly portrayed. Cybersecurity threats will be 
specifically targeted, rather than attacking the Internet as a 
whole. Claims to the contrary, while common, are either sloppy 
or simply wrong.214 Moreover, there are at least two additional 
constraints that suggest attacks will target specific systems 
and information. First, some attackers—particularly nation-
states—have significant Internet dependencies as well. China, 
for example, is linked into the global financial system via the 
Internet, and has integration in other economic sectors as 
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well.215 This point should not be overstated—political theorists 
famously predicted in the years before World War I that Eu-
rope‘s economies were too conjoined to permit conflict to 
erupt,216 and attackers such as North Korea have little to lose if 
the Internet goes offline217—but the possibility of suffering self-
inflicted damage should moderate the scope of attacks. This 
analysis accords with military theory suggesting that attackers 
generally leave room to escalate the level or severity of attacks, 
so as to push their enemy to quit the fight.218 This ―escalation 
dominance‖ would likely also influence a state launching cy-
berwar to focus its attacks, and to leave space for increased 
pressure.219  
Second, a cyberattack on a country with military power, 
such as the United States, would invite reprisal in conventional 
(kinetic) terms even if attribution were only probabilistic or un-
certain.220 Indeed, after the alleged North Korean cyberattack 
on the U.S. and South Korea, the ranking Republican member 
of the Intelligence Committee of the House of Representatives 
called for a ―show of force or strength‖ against that country, 
though North Korea‘s role was not free from doubt.221 The 
broader the attack (and concomitant damage), the more likely 
that a response would involve conventional weapons.222 In ad-
dition, an attack launched from computers in third-party coun-
tries, to disguise its origins, might cause those states to treat 
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the attacker as a belligerent, and possibly to carry out reprisals 
against it.  
There is significant evidence to support these contentions. 
To date, hackers and spies have struck specific targets—for ex-
ample, data on the U.S. Joint Strike Fighter,223 funds in a 
bank‘s accounts,224 overseas political opponents of a govern-
ment,225 or key equipment in a nuclear enrichment facility226—
rather than assaulting Internet connectivity in general. In cas-
es of cyberwar particularly, attackers have mounted assaults 
with a specific focus: combatants‘ systems, and their data. The 
cyberattack on Estonia sought to alter Web pages of that coun-
try‘s government, to prevent Estonian citizens from accessing 
news sites, and to discourage other countries from accepting In-
ternet traffic from Estonia.227 Even North Korea—commonly 
described as the state most likely to wage all-out cyberwar, giv-
en its limited information systems exposure to reprisal—has 
been judicious in its attacks so far.228 The distributed denial of 
service attack attributed to North Korea aimed at specific tar-
gets: websites of selected U.S. government agencies, such as the 
Department of State and the Secret Service; major financial in-
stitutions such as the New York Stock Exchange; South Korean 
government websites; and South Korean banks. Clarke and 
Knake, whose book Cyber War argues that cyberattack threats 
are considerable in scale, call the North Korean attack ―con-
trolled‖ and ―fairly sophisticated.‖229 Cyberattackers are not ni-
hilists. They have not sought to bring the Internet down as an 
end in itself. Rather, the Internet is a convenient pathway to 
accomplish their goals. Thus, cyberthreats are likely to target 
specific information or services on the Internet, rather than the 
network itself, and there are moderating factors that would re-
strain at least some attackers.  
A more restrained and realistic view of cyberthreats is 
helpful to regulation. Available evidence on Internet damage 
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strongly suggests that rushing to regulate is unnecessary, and 
potentially harmful. The Internet‘s fundamental design treats 
managing network disruptions, including from attacks, as a 
core goal. Cyberattacks would likely produce effects similar to 
other large-scale network problems, such as from natural disas-
ters—they would slow traffic and increase costs, but routing 
would continue. In short, cyberspace is not falling, and over-
heated descriptions of cyberapocalypse obscure cybersecurity‘s 
true challenges. Policymakers have sufficient time to craft 
thoughtful solutions. Code is on their side. The next Section de-
scribes the approach that should guide their efforts. 
III.  TED STEVENS WAS RIGHT: CYBERSECURITY AS 
INFORMATION PROBLEM   
Cybersecurity is, in truth, a problem of information. In this 
regard, Senator Ted Stevens was, ironically, correct: the Inter-
net is a series of tubes.230 Cybersecurity should concentrate on 
what flows through the tubes as its primary concern, rather 
than the tubes themselves. Indeed, such an orientation com-
ports with the development principles of the Internet itself—
the network is designed to be indifferent to the underlying con-
nectivity that moves data from point to point. Users are uncon-
cerned with how packets move across the Internet. They care 
only about their ability to send and receive them at the net-
work‘s edge. This Article proposes that cybersecurity should 
concentrate on information, as evidenced by users‘ goals. 
A. INFORMATION LAW‘S HERITAGE 
Focusing on information as the key tenet for regulation has 
a strong theoretical lineage, though it is relatively new to legal 
academia. Mary Graham has written on the use of information, 
and mandates for its provision, as a means of regulating prob-
lems from pollution to obesity.231 Laws governing equity mar-
kets dictate the disclosure, and retention, of information about 
publicly traded corporations.232 Trade secret statutes protect 
economically valuable private information to generate incen-
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tives for its production and use.233 Scholarly debates about 
network neutrality concentrate not on the network‘s structure, 
but on how that structure affects the creation of information. 
Organizing research around information has revolutionized 
fields from behavioral biology,234 to mathematics,235 to econom-
ics.236 An information-focused approach helped biologists ex-
plain why male peacocks developed ornate tails that make 
them easier targets for predators;237 why rich single men pub-
licly donate considerable sums to charity;238 why spiders build 
decorations into their webs;239 and why birds call loudly when 
doing so attracts the attention of raptors.240 It explains why 
people spend so much free time on social networking sites.241 
Similarly, economics is increasingly dominated by the 
study of information;242 indeed, in 2001, the Nobel Prize for the 
field was awarded to three economists who pioneered the study 
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of asymmetric information in markets.243 Behavior by market 
participants is increasingly explained by analyzing its informa-
tional content, from firms that offer product warranties,244 to 
the difficulties of selling a used car,245 to corporate decisions to 
offer shareholders a dividend.246 Information economics ex-
plains why it is hard to sell an unsolicited script to a Hollywood 
movie studio,247 or data on a bug to a software vendor.248 Even 
wedding receptions play an informational role in social mar-
kets.249 Economists have acknowledged information‘s power to 
shape markets—and vice versa—at least since F.A. Hayek‘s 
work on prices as aggregators of private data.250 Increasingly, 
though, economic scholarship is oriented towards information 
as a principal focus.251 
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Mathematics, too, has shifted towards an information-
centric approach, especially with game theory. This move began 
with the work of John von Neumann on games with both per-
fect252 and imperfect253 information, which he later applied to 
nuclear deterrence during the Cold War.254 Mathematicians 
such as John Nash,255 Norbert Wiener,256 and Lloyd Shapley257 
refined and extended game theory. Game theory revolves 
around information: one‘s strategy is altered by what one 
knows about everyone else‘s strategies.258 The mathematics of 
information have revolutionized approaches to problems as di-
verse as authenticating digital data,259 voting manipulation,260 
dealing with rogue states,261 and auctions of spectrum rights.262 
The key insight of game theory is that analysis must begin with 
assessing information, and in particular what information is 
accessible in a given system.263 
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information is used to provide effective control). 
 257. See generally L.S. Shapley, A Value for n-Person Games, in II CONTRI-
BUTIONS TO THE THEORY OF GAMES 307 (H.W. Kuhn & A.W. Tucker eds., 
1953) (applying game theory to abstract games). 
 258. See JÜRGEN EICHBERGER, GAME THEORY FOR ECONOMISTS 16–17 
(1993) (discussing the ways in which one‘s strategy is affected by his or her 
opponent). 
 259. See generally Gustavus J. Simmons, A Game Theory Model of Digital 
Message Authentication, 34 CONGRESSUS NUMERANTIUM 413 (1982) (using 
mathematical models to describe participant objectives in authentication 
games). 
 260. See generally ALAN D. TAYLOR, SOCIAL CHOICE AND THE MATHEMAT-
ICS OF MANIPULATION (2005) (presenting theorems of mathematical naturality 
that deal with the manipulability of voting systems). 
 261. See generally THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 
(1960) (applying game theory to international conflicts). 
 262. PATRICK BAJARI & JEREMY T. FOX, MEASURING THE EFFICIENCY OF AN 
FCC SPECTRUM AUCTION 31 (2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/be/ 
seminardocs/bajarifox_auction.pdf. 
 263. See EICHBERGER, supra note 258 (discussing analysis of behavior in 
games of chess and penny matching and stating that ―if optimal behavior of a 
player depends on the opponent‘s action, then the player needs to know what 
this opponent knows about the game and her behavior‖). 
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This Article draws upon information-based models in other 
scholarly fields to formulate a new theory of cybersecurity. The 
first critical, and difficult, step for this theory is to define what 
constitutes ―information.‖ At one level, every piece of data on 
the Internet, from Border Gateway Protocol messages to spam 
messages, constitutes information. However, this is not helpful: 
some of this data is already protected by wide distribution (for 
example, DNS information is frequently cached by servers),264 
and some of it does not require protection (for example, state-
less protocols such as HTTP do not need to track requests, as 
they can be retransmitted).265 This Article proposes a purposive 
definition of information: Internet data counts as information 
when it is something that users seek to access or engage with. 
A broker seeking the latest financial news from the Wall Street 
Journal is indifferent to the IP address of the Journal‘s web-
site, and a bibliophile who wants to order Cormac McCarthy‘s 
Blood Meridian does not care whether Barnes and Noble is 
available at bn.com versus barnesandnoble.com. They care 
about accessing market news, or ordering the book. Information 
is the goal; data that route information to users are best un-
derstood as infrastructure. Information thus encompasses me-
ta-data as well: it matters significantly to a user if an e-mail 
regarding her credit card bill resides in the ―Paid‖ or ―Unpaid‖ 
folder of her e-mail file. As we will see, information should be 
stored inefficiently; infrastructure need not be inefficient. 
One can analogize the purposive definition of information 
to the distinction made in Fourth Amendment and privacy doc-
trine between routing data and content data: the words spoken 
during a phone call are content, while the number dialed is 
routing data.266 The content/routing approach operates with a 
similar orientation to the new cybersecurity theory, as the dis-
tinction depends on whether the communicating party evinces 
a reasonable expectation of privacy in that signal.267 Thus, it 
too focuses on user expectations. However, the distinction be-
tween routing data and content has, rightly, been criticized as 
collapsing at points.268 There is both semantic and practical 
 
 264. DOUGLAS E. COMER, COMPUTER NETWORKS AND INTERNETS 74–75 
(5th ed. 2009). 
 265. LEON SHKLAR & RICHARD ROSEN, WEB APPLICATION ARCHITECTURE 
34 (2003). 
 266. Compare Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (content), with 
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (routing data). 
 267. Katz, 389 UnitedStates at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 268. Daniel J. Solove, Reconstructing Electronic Surveillance Law, 72 GEO. 
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content value to learning a sender‘s e-mail address, even 
though that address is treated as routing data in constitution-
al269 and statutory270 privacy analyses. The e-mail address 
might well count as information, not infrastructure. Hence, the 
content/routing categories do not map perfectly; some material 
classified as routing data for privacy purposes could constitute 
information for cybersecurity purposes. 
A simple test for the distinction between information and 
infrastructure is to consider how one would implement redun-
dancy (as proposed in Part IV). Take, for example, the website 
for the White House. The site contains pages on President Ob-
ama‘s cabinet members, press briefings, policy issues, and pres-
idential pets.271 Its domain name is www.whitehouse.gov. For-
mer cybersecurity czar Richard Clarke arranged for the White 
House site to be mirrored on Akamai‘s content caching servers 
to increase its redundancy, and hence security.272 Thus, a user 
seeking a photo of President Obama‘s dog Bo on the White 
House site might in fact be connected to an Akamai server. The 
user is unconcerned about whether whitehouse.gov resolves to 
whitehouse.gov.edgesuite.net (an Akamai domain), but is (per-
haps sadly) quite concerned about whether he can reach the 
picture of Bo at that address. Information is the material that a 
user expects to find, to view, or to make use of, regardless of 
where it is located. The domain name, IP address, server iden-
tity and physical location of the White House website may 
change, and are infrastructure. The photo of Bo is information. 
This conceptually clean distinction may prove complicated 
in individual cases. One can argue whether a sender‘s e-mail 
address should be classified as information or as infrastructure, 
 
WASH. L. REV. 1264, 1287–88 (2004). But see Orin S. Kerr, A User‘s Guide to 
the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator‘s Guide to Amending It, 72 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1228 n.142 (2004). 
 269. See, e.g., U.S. v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 270. 18 U.S.C. § 3121(c) (2006). 
 271. See Issues, THE WHITEHOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/issues ( last 
visited Nov. 7, 2011); Presidential Pets, THE WHITEHOUSE, http://www 
.whitehouse.gov/photos-and-video/photogallery/presidential-pets ( last visited 
Nov. 7, 2011); Press Briefings, THE WHITEHOUSE, http://www.whitehouse 
.gov/briefing-room/press-briefings ( last visited Nov. 7, 2011); The Cabinet, THE 
WHITEHOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/cabinet ( last visited 
Nov. 7, 2011). 
 272. CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 23, at 24, 112. A DNS query performed 
on February 19, 2011, indicates that www.whitehouse.gov is still hosted by 
Akamai, as the canonical name contains Akamai‘s edgesuite.net. 
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particularly given that such addresses are readily faked.273 
However, focusing on this question—whether given data counts 
as information—is precisely the point of this Article‘s approach. 
It evaluates cybersecurity by seeking to determine what con-
tent users want to engage with, rather than how it reaches 
them, or why. An information-oriented approach employing a 
purposive definition usefully re-orients cybersecurity towards 
users‘ needs.  
Organizing cybersecurity around information has addi-
tional advantages. It provides a theoretical basis for developing 
responses, and for measuring their efficacy. Cybersecurity im-
proves when authorized users can access the information they 
seek, and when unauthorized ones cannot. The information 
framework for cybersecurity is a functionalist one: it posits a 
set of goals or ends, and then measures possible responses 
based on how they achieve those ends.274 At base, it is conse-
quentialist, concerned more with outcomes than with the paths 
taken to reach them.275 Moreover, the information-based ap-
proach comports with the underlying interests of Internet us-
ers, and sets aside more parochial concerns such as allocation 
of responsibility for enforcement, choice of regulatory metho-
dology, or identification of malefactors.  
Also, this theory avoids (or takes in passing) the welter of 
complications that ensues from standard scholarly approaches 
that try to sort behavior into the traditional categories of war, 
crime, terror and espionage based on an actor‘s identity and in-
tent.276 Consider, for example, a denial of service attack on a 
stock exchange‘s website.277 The attack could be motivated by 
 a desire to extort payments from the target (crime), by a na-
tion-state seeking to interfere with key infrastructure (war), or 
by a violent non-state group making a political statement (ter-
 
 273. See Bambauer, supra note 90, ¶¶ 14–15 (explaining how spam works 
based on trust between email domains). 
 274. On functionalism, see generally Michael J. Madison, Notes on a Geo-
graphy of Knowledge, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2039, 2067–70 (2009) and Mark 
Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 YALE L.J. 
1225, 1238–69 (1999). 
 275. Information law can also be grounded in process-based deontological 
approaches. See generally Derek E. Bambauer, Cybersieves, 59 DUKE L.J. 377 
(2009). 
 276. See, e.g., Brenner, supra note 17, at 404 (discussing complications in 
the threat dichotomy that arises from untraditional attacks in cyberspace). 
 277. See, e.g., Devlin Barrett, Hackers Penetrate NASDAQ Computers, 
WALL ST. J., Feb. 5, 2011, at A1.  
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ror).278 Hackers are skilled in concealing their tracks, and the 
Internet‘s architecture aids them in evading attribution. This 
deficit in identifying data stymies traditional scholarly models, 
which are left to call for better initial security (thereby wishing 
away the problem), and for alterations to the Internet that en-
hance attribution. Yet, while determining intent may help allo-
cate responsibility for a response, it is ultimately irrelevant to 
the problem, which is that users cannot access information 
about their stocks on the exchange‘s site.279 The information-
based approach is both conceptually more precise, and more 
closely aligned to the purposes for which people access the In-
ternet.  
Next, this Article proposes three core concerns for its in-
formation-based theory of cybersecurity: access, alteration, and 
integrity. 
B. ACCESS 
Access to information measures whether users can obtain 
desired data via the Internet. Access can be conceived as a con-
tinuum with both a positive and negative range. In the positive 
direction, cybersecurity seeks to ensure that those who are au-
thorized or intended to consume information are able to do so. 
In the negative direction, cybersecurity tries to prevent those 
who are not authorized to access data from doing so. Distribut-
ing information across multiple computers, for example, reduc-
es the likelihood that an attacker can completely prevent access 
to that data.280 Thus, the e-commerce firm Amazon thwarted 
the hacktivist group Anonymous by making use of the compa-
ny‘s EC2 cloud computing service.281 Anonymous was unable to 
overwhelm Amazon‘s legion of Web servers; consumers were 
still able to reach the site282 and the hackers later publicly ad-
 
 278. See id. (discussing that there are multiple motivations for hacking into 
the exchanges network).  
 279. See, e.g., Gregg Keizer, Russia‘s Stock Market Knocked Offline By DoS 
Attack, INFO. W. (Feb. 3, 2006), http://www.informationweek.com/news/ 
security/government/ 178601897. 
 280. See, e.g., CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 23, at 24, 112. 
 281. Paul McDougall, Amazon Cloud Withstands WikiLeaks Attack, INFO. 
W. (Dec. 9, 2010, 4:31 PM), http://www.informationweek.com/news/security/ 
attacks/ 228800075. 
 282. Julianne Pepitone, Why Attackers Can‘t Take Down Amazon.com, 
CNNMONEY (Dec. 9, 2010, 2:35 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2010/12/09/ 
technology/amazon_wikileaks_attack/index.htm. 
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mitted defeat.283 Amazon‘s efforts demonstrate one effective 
means of addressing the positive aspect of access: overprovi-
sioning ensured that those who wished to reach the site‘s in-
formation could do so.284 
The negative aspect of access, though, is different: Amazon 
did not seek to prevent Anonymous from reaching its online 
store, but merely from blockading it. Cybersecurity also impli-
cates access‘s negative range—on preventing undesired access 
to data. During the 2004 American presidential campaign, for 
example, the campaign website of President George W. Bush 
rejected access attempts from computers with non-U.S. IP ad-
dresses.285 The Bush reelection campaign sought to limit access 
to the site‘s information to its target users: American voters. 
This concern is conceptually different from the positive aspect 
of access. It requires differentiating among requests for data, 
either by using proxies for permission (such as the user‘s IP 
address)286 or directly by issuing credentials (such as name and 
password combinations, or cryptographic keys).287 Blocking 
access can also be a blanket prohibition, such as when coun-
tries engage in statewide filtering of information.288 China, for 
example, blocks all users on its network from accessing sites 
such as the official home page of the government of Taiwan, or 
that of the activist group Human Rights in China.289 Thus, pos-
itive access requires ensuring that the right users can reach 
data, while negative access requires keeping the wrong users 
away from it.  
 
 283. Id. 
 284. Amazon‘s strategy is also effective in increasing the positive alteration 
aspect of cybersecurity, as discussed infra Part III.C. 
 285. Geolocation filtering: www.georgewbush.com Blocked During Run-up 
to Election, OPENNET INITIATIVE (Oct. 27, 2004), http://opennet.net/bulletins/007/. 
 286. See, e.g., UEJF & LICRA v. Yahoo! Inc. & Yahoo! France, Tribunal de 
grande instance [TGI] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction] Paris, Nov. 20, 
2000 (Fr.), available at http://www.juriscom.net/txt/jurisfr/cti/tgiparis20001120 
.pdf (translation available at http://www.lapres.net/yahen.html) (noting that 
Yahoo! could block French users from accessing prohibited hate speech content 
based on IP address). 
 287. See, e.g., David W. Chadwick & Alexander Otenko, Implementing Role 
Based Access Controls Using X.509 Privilege Management—the PERMIS Au-
thorisation Infrastructure, in SECURITY AND PRIVACY IN ADVANCED NETWORK-
ING TECHNOLOGIES 26, 38 (Borka Jerman-Blazic et al. eds., 2004) (showing 
how PERMIS provides an authorization engine which determines which users 
are allowed to perform which actions). 
 288. See generally Bambauer, supra note 275 (discussing internet censor-
ship). 
 289. ACCESS CONTROLLED, supra note 95, at 21. 
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C. ALTERATION 
Alteration similarly has positive and negative aspects. Al-
teration is separate from access, as one may access information 
without being able to alter it, and vice-versa. A user can read 
stock price updates from the New York Stock Exchange without 
having the capability to alter that information. Similarly, a cit-
izen who engages in electronic voting has the power to alter the 
underlying information (the total votes cast, as well as the 
number cast for a particular candidate) without having the ca-
pacity to access it.290 I can send you an e-mail message, thereby 
changing your Inbox, without being able to access your Inbox. 
The positive range of alteration seeks to ensure that authorized 
users can change information. Facebook, for example, was un-
available to people attempting to post status updates, or to in-
dicate how much they ―like‖ a Web page, for nearly three hours 
in September 2010—an example of trivial importance, but one 
of wide incidence, as the social network boasts over 500 million 
users.291 Less trivially, the ability to alter information is at the 
root of electronic commerce, messaging, and financial data ex-
change. Positive alteration concerns include ensuring that the 
data to be updated is available, and that authorized users can 
make changes to it. 
Cybersecurity‘s negative range for alteration focuses on 
preventing changes to information by unauthorized users. This 
could involve preventing the wholesale deletion of data, such as 
occurred when U.K. Internet Service Provider VAServ lost the 
contents of over 100,000 hosted sites due to hacking in June 
2009.292 The hackers gained root access on the system, allowing 
them to delete files; the loss was particularly problematic for 
customers subscribing to VAServ‘s lower-cost unmanaged ser-
vice, where data was not backed up systematically.293 One 
might also view Amazon‘s deletion of the George Orwell novel 
1984 from its customers‘ Kindle e-book readers as unauthorized 
alteration (although Amazon claimed refuge in boilerplate au-
 
 290. See generally Ronald L. Rivest, Electronic Voting, MASS. INST. TECH. 
http://people.csail.mit.edu/rivest/Rivest-ElectronicVoting.pdf ( last visited Nov. 
7, 2011). 
 291. Jennifer Valentino-DeVries, What Caused Facebook‘s Worst Outage in 
Four Years, WALL ST. J. BLOG (Sept. 24, 2010, 10:50 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/ 
digits/2010/09/24/what-caused-facebooks-worst-outage-in-four-years. 
 292. Dan Goodin, Webhost Hack Wipes Out Data for 100,000 Sites, THE 
REG. (June 8, 2009, 8:02 PM), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2009/06/08/webhost_ 
attack/. 
 293. Id. 
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thorization language in the Kindle terms of service agree-
ment).294 Unauthorized alteration could also come in the form 
of changes to information, rather than its complete erasure. For 
example, the hacker group Iranian Cyber Army left virtual 
graffiti on the home page of China‘s Baidu search engine in 
January 2010, replacing its usual appearance with an image of 
Iran‘s flag.295 The Stuxnet cyberweapon replaced actual centri-
fuge data with faked information indicating the machines were 
operating normally, lulling Iran‘s nuclear engineers into a false 
sense of security.296 While it is easy to recognize when a web-
site has been defaced, unauthorized alteration of information 
could be more subtle, and difficult to detect, as Stuxnet  
demonstrates. 
Lastly, the information-based theory raises a second-order 
concern: data integrity. This issue arises after a user seeks ei-
ther to access or alter information. The concern is whether the 
user is interacting with valid, up-to-date information. In distri-
buted computing systems, such as where websites are cached 
 to improve access speeds, either users must accept that data 
will be stale (though perhaps only slightly so), or systems must 
devise ways to rapidly propagate changes to each copy of the 
information.297 Thus, when most users load CNN.com in their 
Web browser, the page returned comes not directly from CNN‘s 
servers, but instead from a copy cached by Akamai.298 Users, 
and CNN itself, trade accuracy for speed. For some purposes, 
though, such as financial transactions, using real-time data is 
critical. Financial companies build expensive high-speed net-
works to ensure that information is up-to-date.299 The London 
 
 294. Brad Stone, Amazon Erases Orwell Books From Kindle, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 18, 2009, at B1; Mark Hachman, Amazon‘s Bezos Apologizes for ‗1984‘ 
Kindle Boondoggle, PCMAG.COM (July 24, 2009, 7:18 PM), http://appscout 
.pcmag.com/mobile-apps/272034-amazon-s-bezos-apologizes-for-1984-
kindleboondoggle#fbid=UEnYsvQkesW. 
 295. Melanie Lee, China‘s Baidu Website Defaced by Twitter Hackers, REU-
TERS, Jan. 12, 2010, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/01/12/ 
china-hacking-idUSTOE60B05U20100112. 
 296.  See supra notes 2–6 and accompanying text. 
 297. See, e.g., Geoff Huston, Web Caching, 2 INTERNET PROTOCOL J. 2 
(1999), available at http://www.cisco.com/web/about/ac123/ac147/archived_issues/ 
ipj_2-3/ipj_2-7.pdf. 
 298. See, e.g., Press Release, CNN.com Teams with Akamai to Deliver 
Record Traffic on Election Day, (Nov. 10, 2004), available at http://www.akamai 
.com/html/about/press/releases/2004/press_111004.html. 
 299. Charles Duhigg, Stock Traders Find Speed Pays, in Milliseconds, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 24, 2009, at A1. 
 632 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [96:584 
 
Stock Exchange replaced its matching engine because the soft-
ware experienced delays of up to 2 milliseconds; the new Linux-
based engine operates with an average latency of only 125 mi-
croseconds.300 High-frequency trading executes orders in a few 
hundred microseconds—these trades occur so rapidly that the 
physical location of the server executing them affects their tim-
ing.301 Similarly, cybersecurity must consider how to signal to 
users whether a given piece of information reflects the most re-
cent set of authorized changes. 
Integrity also requires providing a method to determine 
whether information, including up-to-date information, is val-
id—whether it encompasses only authorized changes. The 
Stuxnet worm exemplifies this concern: it caused Iran‘s centri-
fuges to relay inaccurate information, concealing the weapon‘s 
effects on the uranium enrichment process.302 Author Tom L. 
Clancy offered another example, before the Internet was in 
widespread use, in his 1995 novel Debt of Honor. In the book, 
operatives covertly falsify data on the New York Stock Ex-
change trading system during a conflict between Japan and the 
U.S., leading to a financial panic. Traders are unable to deter-
mine what information is valid, leading to economic chaos.303 
To prevent similar real-world problems, the information-based 
approach posits that cybersecurity must incorporate mechan-
isms to determine whether a given datum‘s state reflects only 
authorized changes.  
D. INTEGRITY 
Finally, information integrity must grapple with changes 
in distributed data stores. When information resides in mul-
tiple locations, it is possible—perhaps even likely—that autho-
rized users will make changes to different copies at the same 
 
 300. Leo King, London Stock Exchange Price Data Failures ‗Emerged Im-
mediately at Millennium Launch‘, COMPUTERWORLD UK (Feb. 18, 2011, 5:40 
PM), http://www.computerworlduk.com/news/it-business/3261816/london-stock 
-exchange-price-data-failures-emerged-immediately-at-millennium-launch. 
 301. Jacob Aron, High-Speed Trading Algorithms Place Markets at Risk, 
NEW SCIENTIST (July 8, 2011, 3:39 PM), http://www.newscientist.com/blogs/ 
onepercent/2011/07/high-speed-trading-algorithms.html?DCMP=OTC-rss&nsref= 
online-news. 
 302.  See supra notes 2–6 and accompanying text. 
 303. Clarke and Knake contemplate a similar scenario and recommend 
Clancy‘s solution: rolling back data to the last known valid state. CLARKE & 
KNAKE, supra note 23, at 204. 
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time.304 Distributed database systems such as Lotus Notes 
must incorporate mechanisms for resolving these disparities 
during updates.305 At minimum, systems must be capable of 
choosing which copy counts as the most up-to-date valid instan-
tiation of the data. Optimally, an information-based approach 
would provide means for reconciling conflicting changes, and of 
tracking the history of alterations to each copy.306  
Fortunately, the computer science literature offers numer-
ous techniques to accomplish these functions. For example, 
cryptographic hash functions enable the use of manipulation 
detection codes, whereby one can detect alteration to a given 
data set.307 Voting-based methods compare multiple instances 
of a data set; the version with the greatest number of instantia-
tions is treated as correct.308 To understand voting, imagine 
three instances of a CNN.com headline. Two read ―Truman De-
feats Dewey‖; one reads ―Dewey Defeats Truman.‖ The first 
version, where Truman wins, has more ―votes‖ and thus counts 
as the correct version. Similarly, message digest functions can 
validate integrity even in challenging technical environments 
such as peer-to-peer media streaming.309 In addition, programs 
such as BitTorrent,310 Lotus Notes,311 mySQL,312 and Oracle 
 
 304. Formally, these would be different updates even if the underlying data 
change made by each user were the same (such as altering a bit from a value 
of 1 to 0), as each change has a different provenance. 
 305. See Replication and Save Conflicts, IBM, http://publib.boulder.ibm 
.com/infocenter/domhelp/v8r0/index.jsp?topic=/com.ibm.help.domino.admin.doc
/DOC/H_ABOUT_REPLICATION_AND_SAVE_CONFLICTS.html ( last up-
dated Oct. 5, 2009) (providing directions on reducing replication or save  
conflicts). 
 306. Id.; see also Todd L. Graves et al., Predicting Fault Incidence Using 
Software Change History, 26 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SOFTWARE ENGINEER-
ING 653 (2000) (using statistical models to evaluate which characteristics lead 
to a large number of faults). 
 307. See ALFRED J. MENEZES ET AL., HANDBOOK OF APPLIED CRYPTOGRA-
PHY 321–67 (1997). 
 308. See, e.g., Johannes Osrael et al., Adaptive Voting for Balancing Data 
Integrity with Availability, in ON THE MOVE TO MEANINGFUL INTERNET SYS-
TEMS 2006: OTM 2006 WORKSHOPS 1510, 1510–18 (Robert Meersman et al. 
eds., 2006) (discussing replication of data for maintaining system availability 
and various voting methods employed to determine the correct data set). 
 309. Ahsan Habib et al., Verifying Data Integrity in Peer-to-Peer Media 
Streaming, in MULTIMEDIA COMPUTING AND NETWORKING 11 (Surendar 
Chandra et al. eds., 2005). 
 310. BitTorrent uses a cryptographic hash to allow nodes to detect whether 
a piece of a requested file has been modified. See Andrew Loewenstern, DHT 
Protocol, BITTORRENT.ORG, http://www.bittorrent.org/beps/bep_0005.html (last 
updated Feb. 28, 2008). 
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Fusion313 implement such techniques. Thus, there is a body of 
both theoretical methods and software implementation exam-
ples for cybersecurity to draw upon in dealing with information 
integrity. 
E. REORGANIZING CYBERSECURITY 
This new theory, with its focus on accessing, altering, and 
verifying the integrity of information, usefully illuminates the 
flaws in current scholarly approaches that concentrate on iden-
tity and intent. As the following table makes clear, traditional 
methodologies classify the same actions, and effects on infor-
mation, differently depending on who carries them out, and for 
what purpose. This may be helpful for second-order reasons, 
such as whether a response to an attack falls within the pur-
view of military or civilian authorities. However, it reifies these 
concerns at the expense of core issues of cybersecurity. When 
users are prevented from reaching critical information, they are 
less concerned with the identity and goals of those responsible 
than with having access restored. Similarly, if someone makes 
unauthorized changes to information, those who want to use it 
will be more focused on restoring that data to its last known va-
lid state than on parsing why it was altered. Information wants 
to be used. The information-based approach to cybersecurity 
concentrates on those uses. 
 
Information-Based Theory Identity/Intent-Based Theories 
Positive Access 
(ensure authorized access) 
Crime (ransomware) 
Terrorism (denial of service) 
War (denial of service) 
Negative Access  
(prevent unauthorized access) 
Espionage  
(data theft/intelligence gathering) 
Crime (IP theft) 
Positive Alteration  
(ensure authorized changes) 
Crime  
(distributed denial of service) 
Terrorism (denial of service) 
War (denial of service) 
 
 311. Replication and Save Conflicts, supra note 305 (providing directions 
on consolidating replication or save conflicts). 
 312. Robin Schumacher, Guaranteeing Data Integrity with MySQL 5.0, 
MYSQL, http://kambing.ui.ac.id/mysql/tech-resources/articles/mysql-data-integrity 
.html ( last visited Nov. 7, 2011). 
 313. Solving Common Replication Conflicts, ORACLE, http://download.oracle 
.com/docs/cd/E20295_01/html/821-1220/bcasp.html ( last visited Nov. 7, 2011). 
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Negative Alteration  
(prevent unauthorized changes) 
Crime (hacking/data deletion) 
Terrorism  
(hacking/data deletion) 
War (hacking/data deletion) 
 
The information-based approach to cybersecurity also 
strongly suggests that there are tradeoffs among security goals. 
Specifically, regulators are likely to be forced to choose between 
emphasizing the positive aspects of alteration and access, and 
the negative aspects. Creating more ways for users to reach 
and interact with information will, of necessity, generate more 
pathways for malfeasors to reach that information as well. This 
Article focuses upon a conceptual approach to improving the 
positive aspects of cybersecurity through inefficiency. Future 
work will address cybersecurity‘s negative aspects. The next 
Part describes why, ironically, inefficient data storage and con-
nectivity is useful for positive access and alteration, and then 
turns to the inevitable tradeoffs that this approach entails. 
IV.  INEFFICIENCY‘S VIRTUES   
For cybersecurity‘s positive aspects, inefficiency reigns. 
This is counterintuitive. Efficiency is nearly the Holy Grail of 
computer science, from increasing the speed of search algo-
rithms314 to improving the storage of data on disk.315 Compa-
nies spend considerable sums to gain tiny improvements in ef-
ficiency.316 Financial firms invested hundreds of millions of 
dollars317 in computers, low-latency network connections, and 
proprietary algorithms318 to increase the speed of trades by a 
few milliseconds. The payoff is estimated to be $21 billion an-
 
 314. See generally STEPHEN WISE, GIS BASICS 76–84 (2002) (describing al-
gorithm efficiency). 
 315. See, e.g., P. Chicoine et al., Hard Disk Drive Long Data Sector White 
Paper, IDEMA, 8–9 (Apr. 20, 2007), http://www.idema.gr.jp/technical/white/6_ 
13_07.pdf (describing efficiency gains from conversion to Advanced Format 
disk storage format).  
 316. Duhigg, supra note 299 (describing how stock traders invest money to 
gain improvements in efficiency). 
 317. Rick Bookstaber, The Arms Race in High Frequency Trading, RICK 
BOOKSTABER (Apr. 21, 2009), http://rick.bookstaber.com/2009/04/arms-race-in 
-high-frequency-trading.html. 
 318. See, e.g., Jack Lynch, Programmer Indicted in Goldman Code Theft 
Case, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK BLOG (Feb 11, 2010, 4:49 PM), http://dealbook 
.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/02/11/programmer-indicted-in-goldman-code-theft-case 
(discussing theft of proprietary software and its seriousness). 
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nually.319 Efficiency determines adoption of technological stan-
dards. Apple refuses to support the near-ubiquitous Flash video 
format on its mobile products,320 due primarily to efficiency 
concerns. Former chief executive Steve Jobs called Flash a 
―CPU hog,‖321 and his official statement noted the company‘s 
conclusion that ―[f]lash has not performed well on mobile de-
vices.‖322 Similarly, concerns over compression efficiency of 
competing video codecs blocked adoption of one codec as a stan-
dard in HTML5.323 In short, seeking to increase efficiency in 
computing is the norm, and a proposal to deliberately cultivate 
inefficiency is admittedly unusual. 
Moreover, this pro-efficiency bias is particularly true for 
the Internet. The Internet‘s core design frequently sacrifices 
countervailing considerations in favor of efficiency. For exam-
ple, Internet Protocol does not perform error-checking when 
routing data packets.324 Any packets that go missing must be 
re-transmitted. This ―best efforts‖ model forgoes delivery guar-
antees to optimize IP for efficient data transfer.325 Internet pro-
tocols sometimes must select for efficiency in certain tasks at 
the expense of others. For example, the Domain Name System 
(DNS) uses a distributed database to map domain names to IP 
addresses.326 This mapping improves the efficiency of respond-
ing to requests since there are more DNS servers to share the 
load, some of which will be ―closer‖ on the network to the re-
quester.327 However, the distributed database detracts from the 
efficiency of propagating changes. When IBM changes the IP 
address for the Web server that hosts www.ibm.com, that 
 
 319. Rob Iati, The Real Story of Trading Software Espionage, ADVANCED 
TRADING (July 10, 2009), http://advancedtrading.com/algorithms/ 218401501. 
 320. Stephen Shankland, Jobs: Why Apple Banned Flash from the iPhone, 
CNET NEWS (Apr. 29, 2010, 6:56 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-30685_3 
-20003739-264.html. 
 321. Erica Ogg, Report: Jobs Disses Adobe Flash as ―CPU Hog‖, CNET 
NEWS (Feb 18, 2010, 2:31 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-31021_3-10456175 
-260.html. 
 322. Steve Jobs, Thoughts on Flash, APPLE (Apr. 2010), http://www.apple 
.com/hotnews/thoughts-on-flash. 
 323. Ryan Paul, Decoding the HTML5 Video Codec Debate, ARS TECHNICA 
(July 5, 2009), http://arstechnica.com/open-source/news/2009/07/decoding-the 
-html-5-video-codec-debate.ars. 
 324. INFO. SCIS. INSTIT., RFC 791: INTERNET PROTOCOL 2 (Jon Postel ed., 
Sept. 1981), available at http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc791.txt. 
 325. See, e.g., CHARLES M. KOZIEROK, THE TCP/IP GUIDE 690 (2005). 
 326. CRICKET LIU & PAUL ALBITZ, DNS AND BIND 3–10 (2006). 
 327. See KOZIEROK, supra note 325, at 849 (explaining that this distribu-
tion of data leads to efficiency and reliability). 
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change must be updated in the caches of many DNS servers, 
whereas employing a single, centralized database would ensure 
an instantaneous update.328 While trade-offs between goals are 
inevitable, the underlying principle of maximizing efficiency is 
widely implemented. 
Yet cybersecurity is different. Maximizing users‘ ability to 
access and alter information is best achieved through ineffi-
cient storage and inefficient network connections. Having in-
formation located in multiple places makes it more costly to 
maintain. However, it is also more resilient. A single informa-
tion repository efficiently scales to serve many users, and up-
dates must only be made once. But if attackers discover a vul-
nerability, such as a zero-day attack that affects the monolith, 
all may be lost.329  
Similarly, having a single high-speed network can be high-
ly efficient, until a glitch or attack knocks it offline. Beth Israel 
Deaconess Medical Center in Boston had a state-of-the-art 
network built by Cisco Networks to connect its doctors to medi-
cal data such as electronic health records.330 Yet, when a re-
searcher‘s program flooded the network, the hospital‘s data 
access was cut off.331 For the next four days, staff wrote orders 
on paper and delivered them by hand while technicians worked 
feverishly.332 Having a single point of failure in its computing 
infrastructure forced the hospital to shift information normally 
carried by 100,000 daily e-mails onto paper.333 In the after-
math, Beth Israel Deaconess spent $3 million on upgrading its 
technology—specifically, building a second, parallel network.334 
 
 328. Cf. NAT‘L RES. COUNCIL, SIGNPOSTS IN CYBERSPACE: THE DOMAIN 
NAME SYSTEM AND INTERNET NAVIGATION 43 (2005) (showing how ―the work 
of registering changes [in a DNS model] is distributed among many organiza-
tion,‖ and therefore, could inherently not be instantaneous (although it may be 
less burdensome to each individual organization)). 
 329. See, e.g., Goodin, supra note 292 and accompanying text (discussing 
the destruction of 100,000 websites as a result of a zero-day vulnerability in a 
widely used virtualization application). 
 330. Anne Barnard, Got Paper? Beth Israel Deaconess Copes with a Massive 
Computer Crash, BOS. GLOBE, Nov. 26, 2002, at C1; see also Peter Kilbridge, 
Computer Crash–Lessons from a System Failure, 348 NEW ENG. J. MED. 881, 
881 (2003) (explaining the variety of network applications available to doctors 
and patients). 
 331. Barnard, supra note 330 (describing the crisis faced by the medical 
center when its system froze). 
 332. Michele Kurtz, His Goal: Computerized Patient Records, BOS. GLOBE, 
Aug. 24, 2004, at C2.  
 333. Barnard, supra note 330. 
 334. Id. 
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The network failure was caused initially by bad code—
described in news reports as a ―virus,‖ though a self-inflicted 
one—but in a larger sense was caused by the hospital‘s decision 
to opt for efficiency over redundancy.335  
Inefficiency creates resiliency. Data stored in many places 
gives users more locations to access and alter it. Providing 
many paths to reach that information improves users‘ chances 
of doing so. It can also serve to deter attacks by muting their 
effects. There is little benefit to launching a fruitless attack. 
Thus, inefficiency improves the positive aspects of cybersecuri-
ty. The next two sections of this Article describe how to imple-
ment inefficiency for information and for connectivity. 
A. SCATTERING THE BITS 
WikiLeaks survives.  
Like the hydra, each time an attack cuts off one of Wiki-
Leaks‘s heads, another sprouts. In 2008, a federal judge or-
dered WikiLeaks‘s domain name registrar to sever the site‘s 
link to its wikileaks.org domain name.336 Users who entered 
wikileaks.org into their browser would not reach Julian As-
sange‘s repository. Undaunted, the site shifted to a new domain 
name to evade the block, and the judge eventually surrendered 
and dissolved the injunction.337 In late 2010, after posting a 
massive batch of U.S. diplomatic cables and military docu-
ments, WikiLeaks was dropped as a customer of Amazon‘s 
cloud computing service, forcing the site to find a new Web 
host.338 Its DNS provider, under pressure from a denial of ser-
 
 335. See Kurtz, supra note 332 (using ―virus‖ description to explain the 
computer‘s network problem); see also E-mail from Richard M. Smith to Dec-
lan McCullagh (Dec. 3, 2002, 06:49), available at http://seclists.org/politech/ 
2002/Dec/4 (noting that ―the wounds however were self-inflicted‖). 
 336. Order Granting Permanent Injunction, Bank Julius Baer & Co. v. Wi-
kiLeaks, No. CV08-0824 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 15, 2008), available at http://docs.justia 
.com/cases/federal/district-courts/california/candce/3:2008cv00824/200125/48/. The 
order banned Dynadot from translating requests for the wikileaks.org domain 
name to the relevant IP address. Id. 
 337. Order Denying Motion for Preliminary Injunction; Dissolving Perma-
nent Injunction; And Setting Briefing and Hearing Schedule, WikiLeaks, 535 
F. Supp. 2d 980, 985–86 (N.D. Cal. 2008). 
 338. See Geoffrey A. Fowler, Amazon Says WikiLeaks Violated Terms of 
Service, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 3, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240 
52748703377504575651321402763304.html (explaining that WikiLeaks was 
dropped for breaking Amazon‘s rules of service). 
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vice attack, terminated WikiLeaks as a client.339 The payment 
providers MasterCard and PayPal ceased processing payments 
to WikiLeaks.340 A patriotic hacker launched a cyber attack 
against WikiLeaks that knocked WikiLeaks offline for a 
time.341 Yet, through all of these tribulations, WikiLeaks‘ trove 
of information remained available, mirrored on thousands of 
sites at a host of domain names.342 Users seeking information 
about Australia‘s black list of filtered websites343 or the  
Church of Scientology‘s financial status344 can access such ma-
terial with ease. WikiLeaks accomplishes this remarkable per-
sistence through inefficiency: the site‘s information is widely 
duplicated, ensuring that no single attack can prevent access or 
alteration (such as submitting new documents). WikiLeaks‘s in-
formation lives on multiple servers, including a server located 
in a former nuclear bunker in Stockholm, Sweden,345 on the 
Swedish Pirate Party‘s servers,346 and on the computers of 
 
 339. Charles Arthur & Josh Halliday, WikiLeaks Fights to Stay Online Af-
ter US Company Withdraws Domain Name, THE GUARDIAN, (Dec. 3, 2010), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/blog/2010/dec/03/wikileaks-knocked-off-net-dns 
-everydns. 
 340. See Declan McCullagh, MasterCard Pulls Plug on WikiLeaks Pay-
ments, CNET NEWS (Dec. 6, 2010, 2:37 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-31921_ 
3-20024776-281.html (describing MasterCard‘s decision to stop accepting Wi-
kiLeaks payments); Alexia Tsotsis, PayPal VP on Blocking WikiLeaks: State 
Department Said It Was Illegal, TECHCRUNCH (Dec. 8, 2010), http:// 
techcrunch.com/2010/12/08/paypal-wikileaks/ (discussing PayPal‘s decision to 
block WikiLeaks payments).  
 341. Richard Allen Greene & Nicola Hughes, ‗Hacktivist for Good‘ Claims 
WikiLeaks Takedown, CNN (Nov. 29, 2010), http://www.cnn.com/2010/US/11/ 
29/wikileaks.hacker/index.html?hpt=T1. 
 342. See Brian Prince, WikiLeaks Hit with DoS Attack Before Documents 
Leaked, EWEEK.COM (Nov. 29, 2010), http://www.eweek.com/c/a/Security/ 
WikiLeaks-Hit-With-DoS-Attack-Before-Documents-Leaked-680058/ (crediting 
WikiLeaks‘s ability to avoid significant downtime to its decision to use three 
IP addresses since its launch).  
 343. See Australian Government Secret ACMA Internet Censorship Blacklist, 
18 Mar 2009, WIKILEAKS (Mar. 20, 2009), http://www.wikileaks.info/wiki/ 
Australian_government_secret_ACMA_internet_censorship_blacklist,_18_Mar_ 
2009 (providing a list of the Australian Communication and Media Authority‘s 
―internet censorship blacklist‖). 
 344. Scientology Cult Finance Documents Part 1, WIKILEAKS (Apr. 9, 2008), 
http://www.wikileaks.org/wiki/Scientology_cult_finance_documents_part_1. 
 345. Andy Greenberg, WikiLeaks Servers Move to Underground Nuclear 
Bunker, FORBES (Aug. 30, 2010), http://blogs.forbes.com/andygreenberg/2010/ 
08/30/wikileaks-servers-move-to-underground-nuclear-bunker/?boxes=business 
channeltopstories. 
 346. Swedish Pirate Party to Host WikiLeaks Servers, CNN (Aug. 18, 2010), 
http://edition.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/europe/08/18/sweden.wikileaks/. 
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OVH, a French web services company.347 Changes to Wiki-
Leaks must propagate across these doppelgangers, but the inef-
ficient nature of the site‘s storage increases its security. Wiki-
Leaks arrived at this information architecture through hard 
experience: the site has experienced cyberattacks,348 law en-
forcement pressure,349 and even threats of assassination 
against Assange.350 WikiLeaks is a test case for increasing cy-
bersecurity through information inefficiency. And the results 
are clear: inefficiency works. 
This Article‘s information-oriented theory posits that a key 
goal for cybersecurity is increasing the inefficiency with which 
information is stored. The positive aspects of both access to, 
and alteration of data, emphasize the need to ensure that au-
thorized users can reach, and modify, information. This is more 
likely to occur when users can reach data at multiple locations, 
both because it increases attackers‘ difficulty in blocking their 
attempts, and because it provides fallback options if a given copy 
is not available. In short, data should reside in many places. 
This approach to implementing the information-oriented 
theory of cybersecurity aligns with prior proposals and efforts. 
Jonathan Zittrain suggests that there should not be single, mo-
nolithic Internet repositories of information.351 Instead, he pro-
poses, Web hosts and other ISPs should adopt a communitarian 
ethic of caching data as they relay it in response to user re-
quests.352 Richard Clarke replicated the White House‘s web- 
 
 347. Associated Press, French Company Allowed to Keep Hosting Wiki-
Leaks, YAHOO! FIN. (Dec. 8, 2010, 7:37 AM), http://finance.yahoo.com/news/ 
French-company-allowed-to-apf-1530963796.html?x=0. 
 348. See Greene & Hughes, supra note 341 (discussing a hacker who took 
WikiLeaks‘s site down for political reasons). 
 349. See, e.g., Assange Attorney: Secret Grand Jury Meeting in Virginia on 
WikiLeaks, CNN (Dec. 13, 2010), http://articles.cnn.com/2010-12-13/justice/ 
wikileaks.investigation_1_julian-assange-wikileaks-case-grand-jury?_s=PM:CRIME 
(discussing a criminal investigation into WikiLeaks‘s publication of diplomatic 
cables). 
 350. See Jeffrey T. Kuhner, Assassinate Assange?, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 3, 
2010, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/dec/2/assassinate-assange/ 
(stating that ―Mr. Assange is not a journalist or publisher; rather, he is an 
enemy combatant - and should be treated as such‖ and that ―[t]he administra-
tion must take care of the problem‖). 
 351. See Zittrain, supra note 105, at 2777–78 (arguing that eliminating 
monopolistic repositories of information ―creates a useful friction in the sys-
tem, while still preserving opportunity for removing material‖). 
 352. See id. at 2779–81 (explaining the benefits of such a system by saying 
that ―[i]f one site later fails or is blocked, the user can request a copy of it from 
the server that linked him there‖). 
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site on Akamai‘s servers, allowing the site to remain available 
even during a denial of service attack in July 2009.353 The Bit-
Torrent peer-to-peer application spreads data across its net-
work of nodes so that any one computer holds only a small 
fragment of a particular file.354 Each BitTorrent host thus in-
curs a minimal burden when sharing files, and requests for a 
given file do not depend on any single node‘s availability.355 For 
e-mail, organizations often employ multiple servers correspond-
ing to a single domain name to ensure that messages reach 
their destination even if one computer fails.356 
Most entities that store information deliberately make 
their storage redundant; indeed, such efforts may be legally 
mandated. Attorneys licensed to practice in New York, for ex-
ample, must maintain certain bookkeeping records for seven 
years after a client matter ends.357 U.S. Securities and Ex-
change Commission regulations dictate that accounting firms 
keep records related to auditing and financial statement review 
for seven years after such reviews are concluded.358 The Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act requires that cer-
tain health information be retained for at least six years.359 The 
Food and Drug Administration imposes requirements, under its 
Good Manufacturing Standards, that certain medical device da-
ta be preserved for at least two years from the date the data is 
released for commercial distribution.360 The Occupational 
Health and Safety Act institutes a requirement that data on 
employees‘ workplace exposure to hazardous or toxic sub-
stances be maintained for at least thirty years.361 These exist-
ing requirements suggest that private incentives for informa-
tion storage are frequently inadequate, at least in comparison 
to larger societal interests in that information. Moreover, cy-
bersecurity regulation of information inefficiency can effectively 
 
 353. See CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 23, at 24. 
 354. See, e.g., MATTHEW RIMMER, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT AND THE CONSUMER 
REVOLUTION: HANDS OFF MY IPOD 113–15 (2007) (explaining BitTorret and 
describing it as a ―file distribution tool‖). 
 355. For an argument that BitTorrent‘s file-sharing architecture is faster 
and more efficient than traditional networking sites, see id. at 113.  
 356. This technique involves listing multiple mail exchange, or MX, records 
for a given host name in the Domain Name System. See LIU & ALBITZ, supra 
note 326, at 89–99 (explaining the effect of DNS on electronic mail). 
 357. N.Y. RULES OF PROF ‘L CONDUCT R. 1.15(d) (2009). 
 358. 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-06 (2011). 
 359. 45 C.F.R. § 164.530( j)(2) (2010). 
 360. 21 C.F.R. § 820.180(b) (2011). 
 361. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1020(d)(1)(ii) (2010). 
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free-ride on these mandates, thereby reducing implementation 
costs. 
Establishing information storage requirements through 
public law is challenging. Governmentally specified mandates 
risk being overly costly, rapidly obsolete, or poorly tailored.362 
Deference to private sector best practices, though, risks insuffi-
cient precautions. Firms in the same industry may be willing to 
accept risks, such as cyberattacks, if those risks would cripple 
all competitors equally. For example, firms often fail to take 
adequate data security measures when they face little threat of 
liability or significant reputational sanctions for data spills.363 
Thus, despite arguments that private sector precautions for cy-
bersecurity are sufficient, this Article suggests that cybersecur-
ity regulation of information should do three things: mandate 
inefficiency in storage, test, and invest.364 
1. Mandate Inefficient Storage 
First, Congress should pass cybersecurity legislation that 
requires information to be stored inefficiently. There are three 
legislative dimensions to consider: which entities should be 
covered, what inefficient storage means, and how to enforce the 
mandate. The coverage dimension of cybersecurity has been the 
subject of considerable controversy, primarily over what consti-
tutes ―critical infrastructure‖ subject to enhanced regulation.365 
The scope of such critical infrastructure has expanded greatly 
over time, and particularly with increasing time after the ter-
 
 362. See, e.g., Derek E. Bambauer, Rules, Standards, and Geeks, 5 BROOK. 
J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 49, 49 (2010) (arguing that rules, specifically in indus-
tries characterized by dynamism, tend to be either under- or over-inclusive 
and can be difficult to change).  
 363. See Paul M. Schwartz & Edward J. Janger, Notification of Data Secu-
rity Breaches, 105 MICH. L. REV. 913, 925–32 (2007). 
 364. The need for such an regulation can be evidenced by looking to a re-
cent cybersecurity summit in Dallas, TX. See generally Abigail Rabinowitz, 
Protecting the Digital Economy, EASTWEST INST. (Jan. 10, 2011), http://www 
.ewi.info/protecting-digital-economy (showing arguments that the private sec-
tor and the public sector have not worked together effectively to promote cy-
bersecurity and that greater collaboration is needed). 
 365. See, e.g., Cybersecurity: A Review of Public and Private Efforts to Se-
cure Our Nation‘s Internet Infrastructure: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on In-
fo. Policy, Census & Nat‘l Archives of the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov‘t 
Reform, 110th Cong. 23 (2007) (statement of Gregory C. Wilshusen, Director of 
Information Security Issues, GAO), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/ 
d08212t.pdf (noting that legislation on critical infrastructure protection does 
not address Internet disruptions).  
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rorist attacks of September 11, 2001.366 Ironically, this makes 
later iterations of the term less useful for cybersecurity purpos-
es. For example, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7, 
signed by President George W. Bush on December 17, 2003, 
sweeps in ―key resources,‖ along with critical infrastructure, as 
targets for increased protection, where key resources include 
national monuments and parks.367 Yellowstone National Park 
is unlikely to hold sufficiently critical information to be worthy 
of enhanced protection. Cybersecurity legislation could borrow 
more specific definitions of what constitutes critical infrastruc-
ture in the United States in defining coverage, such as that 
contained in President Bush‘s executive order establishing the 
Office of Homeland Security in 2001.368 Section 3(e) of that ex-
ecutive order sets out a specific list of critical infrastructure 
that the new office is charged with protecting against the con-
sequences of terrorist attacks.369 This list of relevant industries 
and economic sectors makes for a useful initial coverage set for 
information inefficiency regulation.  
An alternative approach to coverage, which would be more 
precise but less accurate, would be to impose information inef-
ficiency requirements on entities covered by existing legal re-
quirements to perform data retention. This requirement would 
be both over-inclusive (medical device manufacturers are not 
necessarily vital to economic functioning)370 and under-
inclusive (not all ISPs would necessarily be covered).371 Howev-
 
 366. See, e.g., JOHN MOTEFF & PAUL PARFOMAK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
RL32631, CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND KEY ASSETS: DEFINITION AND 
IDENTIFICATION 6–7 (2004), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/RL32631 
.pdf (describing the USA PATRIOT Act, which defines ―critical infrastructure‖).  
 367. Id. at 9–10; see also 6 U.S.C. § 101(9) (2006) (defining ―key resources‖); 
42 U.S.C. § 5195c(e)(2006) (defining ―critical infrastructure‖ as systems and 
assets ―so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such 
systems and assets would have a debilitating impact‖ on national security or 
public health). 
 368. See generally Establishing the Office of Homeland Security and the 
Homeland Security Council, Exec. Order No. 13228, 66 Fed. Reg. 51,813 (Oct. 
8, 2001). 
 369. Id. at 51,813–14. 
 370. Cf. supra note 360 and accompanying text (implying that medical de-
vice manufacturers are not vital by having shorter required data retention pe-
riods than other industries). 
 371. Cf. Jaikumar Vijayan, DOJ Seeks Mandatory Data Retention Require-
ment for ISPs, COMPUTERWORLD (Jan. 25, 2011), http://www.computerworld 
.com/s/article/9206379/DOJ_seeks_mandatory_data_retention_requirement_fo
r_ISPs (exploring the current state of data retention with ISPs and noting that 
policy differences between entities has made lawful means of obtaining valua-
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er, this approach would include entities that have implemented 
redundant data storage strategies already. While the new 
mandate would increase the cost of existing strategies, the cost 
differences would be incremental, rather than incorporating the 
greater expenses of initial implementation. 
The second critical legislative question is what inefficiency 
means—in other words, what scope of information must be 
stored inefficiently? Organizations already evaluate this issue 
when implementing a data backup strategy.372 Retaining 
greater volumes of data longitudinally allows an organization 
to recover information farther back in time but boosts storage 
costs and may generate greater legal exposure as more data 
can be discovered in litigation.373 For regulators, this tradeoff is 
made more complicated by the diversity of information needs 
across sectors. Health service providers, for example, may need 
to maintain data longer than other organizations. While pa-
tients may interact with their doctors infrequently, their com-
plete medical histories are vital to proper treatment. Retail 
businesses may have less need for historical data as customers 
and customer needs change more rapidly. Regulators could ei-
ther set a uniform requirement for data inefficiency or tailor 
rules to each industry.374 Targeted rules align costs most close-
ly with benefits, but they also involve greater administrative 
costs in design and enforcement, and invite strategic behavior 
by regulated entities.375 
 
ble evidence ineffective in certain instances, thus suggesting that future laws 
may have similar results). 
 372. See, e.g., W. CURTIS PRESTON, BACKUP & RECOVERY 14 (2007) (noting 
the ―need to balance the cost of a particular backup implementation against 
the projected monetary loss of the outage from which it protects you‖). 
 373. See, e.g., Laurie Miller et al., Document Retention Policies Revisited, 
NIXON PEABODY LLP (May 27, 2003), http://www.nixonpeabody.com/linked_ 
media/publications/CRA_05272003.pdf (acknowledging that ―unnecessary doc-
ument retention is prohibitively expensive‖ and can make responding to dis-
covery requests difficult).  
 374. In regulating information practice in the private sector, for example, 
the U.S. Federal Government has opted for industry-specific policies rather 
than comprehensive legal rules. Joel R. Reidenberg, Setting Standards for 
Fair Information Practice in the U.S. Private Sector, 80 IOWA L. REV. 497, 500 
(1995). 
 375. Cf. William Fisher III, The Disaggregation of Intellectual Property, 55 
HARV. L. BULL. 24, 29–30 (2004), available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/ 
news/bulletin/2004/summer/feature_2-1.php (discussing the relative merits of 
broad versus industry-specific rules for intellectual property and arguing that 
disaggregation in rules is superior since industries vary in the amount of legal 
incentives necessary to spur innovation and compliance). 
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Determining the optimal period for retaining information 
in an inefficient fashion, what information should be included, 
and whether the retention period should vary by entity or in-
dustry are difficult empirical questions that require balancing 
costs and benefits beyond the scope of this Article. Yet all policy 
debates require a starting point. Accordingly, I propose the fol-
lowing rule, to apply to all regulated entities, as an initial re-
quirement:  
An organization shall maintain separate and redundant information 
such that, within 24 hours of losing all access to its primary data 
store, it is able to conduct operations in its ordinary course of opera-
tions for seven consecutive business days. 
Put simply, each regulated organization should store in-
formation in a way that ensures that if it loses its primary data 
bank, it is able to restore normal operations within a day, and 
to continue those operations for a week. This rule is likely to be 
risk-averse, or conservative, for two reasons. First, data from 
disasters such as the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, 
suggest that many businesses are already able to return to op-
erations within a few days, even after major disruptions.376 
Shortening the exposure window to one day will create incre-
mental costs, but it is not likely to be a disproportionate bur-
den. Moreover, service level agreements (SLAs) with informa-
tion service providers, such as IT outsourcing firms, often 
mandate recovery of full operations in even shorter time pe-
riods.377 Verio, for example, offers storage services that provide 
for data recovery in two hours during normal business opera-
tions, and in four hours during after-hours periods.378 Second, 
larger and more sophisticated businesses generally operate re-
dundant data centers, allowing them to switch operations be-
tween centers in case of disruption.379 For example, Oracle op-
 
 376. For examples of rapid repairs to Internet connectivity following vari-
ous disasters, see supra Part II.C. 
 377. See, e.g., Jonathan Raku Mathiesen, Service Level Agreements for Sto-
rage: Report and Sample Documents, PRESTOSPACE, 14–15 (Feb. 23, 2007), 
http://prestospace.org/project/deliverables/D13-5.pdf (showing that a Verio sto-
rage SLA requires a restoration time of four hours or less). 
 378. Id. at 15. 
 379. See, e.g., Rachel Melcer, Ready to Serve, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, 
Jan. 9, 2008, at C1; Randall Stross, 99.999% Reliable? Don‘t Hold Your Breath, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2011, at B3 (explaining Gmail‘s practice of using two per-
fectly mirrored live copies in addition to its backup copies stored offline But see 
Joseph Menn & Michelle Quinn, Power Outage Shuts Down Websites, L.A. 
TIMES, July 25, 2007, at C3 (describing data center outage that knocked e-
commerce firm RedEnvelope offline after RedEnvelope discontinued redun-
dant data centers). 
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erates mirrored global data centers in Texas and Colorado.380 
This implies that larger entities will not find the new informa-
tion efficiency mandate unduly burdensome. Smaller entities, 
which are more likely to incur costs in transitioning to the new 
regulatory scheme, can obtain some relief under the subsidy 
provisions described below. Moreover, small organizations can 
outsource services for information inefficiency, reducing their 
cost burdens relative to in-house provisioning.381 
An even more conservative rule would assume that disrup-
tions to information will include physical as well as digital ef-
fects.382 This rule would require organizations to create ineffi-
ciency not only for information, but also for infrastructure. This 
rule would read: 
An organization shall maintain separate and redundant information 
such that, within 24 hours of losing all access to its primary data 
store and data or IT center, it is able to conduct operations in its ordi-
nary course of operations for seven consecutive business days. 
[changes italicized] 
This version of the rule should be reserved (if used at all) 
for vital information-driven industries such as the financial and 
banking sectors, as its implementation costs could be signifi-
cant. It mandates inefficiency in both information and informa-
tion processing and may require covered entities to effectively 
double their IT capacity.383 Thus, this more conservative, and 
costly, regulation is one that should be tailored by industry sec-
tor—the added administrative costs of determining which areas 
are appropriately covered is justified by the burden on those 
regulated. 
The last issue for regulation is enforcement. To be effec-
tive, enforcement regimes must be able to detect and sanction 
 
 380. Mahesh Sharma & Ben Woodhead, Australia on Radar as Safe Site for 
Oracle Data Centre, THE AUSTRALIAN, Aug. 28, 2007, at 29. 
 381. For a discussion of opportunities for small firms to achieve the same 
benefits as large organizations by outsourcing IT functions, see Jennifer 
Mears, SMBs: Outsourcing a Growth Tool, NETWORK WORLD (Feb. 27, 2006), 
http://www.net-directions.com/info/. 
 382. For example, loss of power could jeopardize an organization‘s ability to 
use its data center. See, e.g., John Holusha, Preserving Data, and Businesses, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2001, at RE1. 
 383. But see Mears, supra note 381 (noting that although the cost of devel-
oping IT strategies can seem daunting, investing in such strategies can actual-
ly reduce an organization‘s expenses by defraying traditional capital invest-
ment in infrastructure and technology, thereby saving the organization money 
long-term).  
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violations predictably.384 Enforcement of the information ineffi-
ciency rule should turn on self-certification based on testing, 
backed by randomized auditing of those testing procedures and 
results for organizations that do not use outside auditors.385 
This approach reduces enforcement costs to the public fisc by 
transferring a portion of the costs to the regulated entities. This 
approach also addresses the risk of cheating through the use of 
credible third parties (accounting firms for publicly traded com-
panies) and governmental inspection (for other entities).  
Determining the proper level of sanctions for violations of 
the rule is easy in principle but difficult in practice.386 Setting 
penalties too high is problematic if the state has some error 
rate in determining correctly whether a violation has occurred, 
as firms may over-invest in precautions.387 Setting penalties too 
low creates incentives for non-compliance.388 Given these un-
certainties, and information asymmetries between regulators 
and regulated entities, the best way to set a penalty for viola-
tors is to use market information. The regulation should re-
quire the Department of Commerce to impose a heightened fine 
on violators who are detected through governmental audits 
(which come at greater cost to the public treasury) or who have 
had a prior violation in the past ten years.389 For these viola-
 
 384. See generally Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic 
Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968) (discussing an ―economic‖ approach to 
enforcing legislation); see also A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The 
Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law, 38 J. ECON. LITERATURE 45, 
45 (2000) (presenting ―the economic theory of public enforcement of law in a 
systematic and comprehensive way‖). 
 385. See infra Part V.A.2 (arguing that organizations should be required to 
test and certify their ability to comply with the proposed cybersecurity rules). 
 386. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, The Optimal Probability and Magnitude of 
Fines for Acts That Definitely Are Undesirable, 12 INT‘L REV. L. & ECON. 3, 3 
(1992) (noting that complete deterrence of crimes is often not desirable be-
cause of the costs of enforcement). 
 387. See STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 
474–75 (2004) (discussing the chilling effect on desirable acts caused by sanc-
tions that are greater than the harm sought to be deterred). 
 388. See generally Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Louis Kaplow, Optimal Sanc-
tions When Individuals Are Imperfectly Informed About the Probability of Ap-
prehension, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 365 (1992) (considering the problem of setting 
optimal sanctions when actors‘ information about the probability of apprehen-
sion is not perfect). 
 389. Cf. David A. Dana, Rethinking the Puzzle of Escalating Penalties for 
Repeat Offenders, 110 YALE L.J. 733, 735–40 (2001) (recognizing the historical 
practice of escalating penalties for repeat violators and discussing how the 
conventional economic model holds that ―an optimal expected penalty should 
equal the harm [or cost] to society of the violation‖). 
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tors, there should be a two-part penalty. First, the organization 
must outsource its implementation of the information ineffi-
ciency rule for the next five years—and must engage a firm 
qualified to audit publicly traded companies in the U.S. to re-
port on its compliance with this penalty. This part of the sanc-
tion would force the violator to turn over compliance to a ser-
vice provider capable of meeting regulatory requirements. In 
addition, third-party monitoring should reduce recidivism at 
the violator‘s expense.390  
Second, the organization must pay a penalty equal to 1.5 
times the average annual cost of the outsourcing. The fine 
would remove any incentive to shirk compliance for cost rea-
sons, as it would be less expensive simply to turn over informa-
tion inefficiency operations to an outside service provider. 
Moreover, the fine would solve the information asymmetry 
problem that bedevils regulators when setting penalty levels391 
by effectively imposing a market test: the violator has incen-
tives to find the best value in outsourcing, knowing that its 
bargain will also set its fine.  
In addition, sanctions on repeat offenders should be made 
public. This would increase the bite of market-based reputa-
tional sanctions and allow consumers to select away from or-
ganizations with poor cybersecurity.392 For example, the regu-
lation could require that such sanctions be disclosed in 
securities filings, as the SEC attempted to do with publicly 
traded entities facing environmental liabilities.393 Revealing 
organizations‘ failures to take adequate cybersecurity precau-
tions would deter violations and improve market data for con-
sumers seeking more resilient firms. 
 
 390. See generally Dilip Mookherjee & I.P.L. Png, Monitoring vis-à-vis In-
vestigation in Enforcement of Law, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 556 (1992) (suggesting 
that socially optimal sanctions balance the benefits derived by offenders 
against the harm caused by non-offenders). 
 391. See David M. Driesen & Shubha Ghosh, The Functions of Transaction 
Costs: Rethinking Transaction Cost Minimization in a World of Friction, 47 
ARIZ. L. REV. 61, 80–81 (2005) (describing the difficulty, both in terms of time 
and cost, that pollution regulators would face in attempting to assign non-
uniform pollution-reduction obligations on facilities). 
 392. See David Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 
104 HARV. L. REV. 375, 411–12 (1990) (arguing that ―reputational sanctions‖ 
correct for deficiencies in legal sanctions). 
 393. See, e.g., Barnaby J. Feder, New Battles Over Disclosure, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 24, 1990, at F10; William Baue, SEC Urged to Strengthen Rules Govern-
ing Corporate Disclosure of Environmental Risks, SOCIALFUNDS (Aug. 21, 
2002), http://www.socialfunds.com/news/article.cgi/911.html. 
 2011] CONUNDRUM 649 
 
First-time violators detected through private audits who 
have not had a previous violation in the past decade should pay 
a fine equal to three-quarters of the cost of one year of out-
sourcing.394 While determining the cost of outsourcing will im-
pose some administrative expense on government regulators, 
the existence of a competitive information technology services 
market should provide reliable data at low cost. Overall, this 
graduated-penalty scheme would minimize both enforcement 
costs and incentives to avoid compliance. 
Like the definition of information, the proposed require-
ment for inefficient data storage is purposive: it compels busi-
nesses to evaluate what information they need to operate nor-
mally after losing their usual ability to access and alter 
content. The proposed requirement also builds on existing prac-
tices in data backup and recovery. Indeed, the federal govern-
ment‘s Ready Business program encourages businesses to per-
form data backup, including storing redundant data offsite.395 
Data inefficiency has side benefits for low-incidence, high-
magnitude risks to information such as natural disasters or 
hacking: recovery is the same regardless of the cause of infor-
mation loss. The next Section of this Article discusses verifying 
whether this inefficiency is sufficient. 
2. Test 
The second regulatory move that the U.S. should make to 
improve the inefficiency of information storage is to mandate 
that regulated entities—those required under the rules de-
scribed above to keep redundant data—test whether their pre-
cautions are sufficient. Cybersecurity regulation should require 
each organization to test its ability to meet the demands of the 
recovery rule, and to certify the results. Moreover, these certifi-
cations should, after a one-year grace period following the 
enactment of the implementing legislation, be made public. 
This publicity should generate market-based and norms-based 
pressures on organizations to comply.396 For publicly traded 
 
 394. The implementing legislation should bestow deference on the Depart-
ment of Commerce to ascertain this cost through market information. Admin-
istrative costs could be minimized by simply allowing the Department of 
Commerce to take a small sampling of price data from outsourcing firms based 
on the violator‘s industry and size. 
 395. Improve Cyber Security, READY BUSINESS, http://www.ready.gov/ 
business/protect/cybersecurity.html ( last updated Apr. 26, 2011). 
 396. See Charny, supra note 392 (suggesting that ―reputational sanctions‖ 
provide strong incentives for organizations to comply with rules). 
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companies, the verification process should be incorporated into 
the testing of internal procedures and controls required by Sec-
tion 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and its implementing regu-
lations.397 Building cybersecurity testing into existing Sar-
banes-Oxley procedures should increase the reliability of 
information inefficiency precautions at relatively minimal cost: 
the check is simply one additional thing that auditors verify. 
For companies not covered by Sarbanes-Oxley, the testing 
requirement—while necessary to ensure that information inef-
ficiency measures are not illusory or ineffective—would 
represent a potentially significant added cost. Sarbanes-Oxley‘s 
regulatory regime has itself come under criticism as unduly 
costly.398 However, the added expense is justified by the cyber-
security benefits. Moreover, there are at least three responses 
to this objection. First, there is an existing industry of firms, 
particularly accounting firms, that have experience with Sar-
banes-Oxley monitoring and certification.399 While engaging a 
firm will create costs for an organization, competitive pressures 
among accounting, IT services, and related firms will constrain 
prices. The burden for firms does not seem likely to be signifi-
cant, particularly when all entities in the same industry face 
roughly similar costs. For example, a survey of large enterpris-
es in 2006 found the average cost to comply with Sarbanes-
Oxley‘s requirements for financial controls, including auditors‘ 
fees, was $2.92 million.400 Moreover, costs had fallen 35% from 
2004, when firms were first obligated to comply.401 Costs, then, 
 
 397. See generally Management‘s Report on Internal Control Over Finan-
cial Reporting and Certification of Disclosure in Exchange Act Periodic Re-
ports, Securities Act Release No. 8238, Exchange Act Release No. 47,986, In-
vestment Company Act Release No. 26,068, 68 Fed. Reg. 36,636 (June 18, 
2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8238.htm (establishing 
Sarbanes-Oxley reporting requirements). 
 398. See generally Anwer S. Ahmed et al., How Costly Is the Sarbanes Ox-
ley Act? Evidence on the Effects of the Act on Corporate Profitability, 16 J. 
CORP. FIN. 352 (2010); James Freeman, The Supreme Case Against Sarbanes-
Oxley, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 15, 2009), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240 
52748704431804574539921864252380.html; Sarbanes-Oxley Audits Too Cost-
ly, Regulator Says, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/ 
09/20/business/worldbusiness/20iht-sec.2875515.html. 
 399. See Matthew J. Barrett, Sarbanes-Oxley, Kermit the Frog, and Compe-
tition Regarding Audit Quality, 3 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 207, 211–13 (2008) (iden-
tifying multiple tiers of firms with expertise in Sarbanes-Oxley auditing). 
 400. SEC Moves to Reduce Sarbanes-Oxley Costs, N.Y. TIMES (May 23, 2007), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/23/business/worldbusiness/23iht-regs.4.5843700 
.html (describing study by Financial Executives International). 
 401. Id. 
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were not only manageable, but decreasing as firms became 
more experienced with the regulation—as a percentage of reve-
nues, costs were lower in 2007 than in 2006.402 As with Sar-
banes-Oxley, initial expenditures for implementing information 
inefficiency, and for testing those new systems, are likely to be 
high, but are also likely to drop with time. Moreover, much of 
that initial expenditure will be directly beneficial to organiza-
tions by enabling them to reduce cybersecurity risks. Second, 
the public subsidy described below will defray at least part of 
the cost that organizations must assume. Finally, either cyber-
security is a significant risk to U.S. interests or it is not.403 Im-
posing cost burdens, and overcoming resistance from regulated 
entities, is in some sense the acid test of regulation. If the risks 
from a lack of cybersecurity are at all like those described in 
Part II, testing and reporting costs are a small price to pay. Da-
ta backups, it is said, are worthless until needed—then, they 
are priceless. This applies with equal force to cybersecurity. 
3. Invest 
Finally, legislation to implement information inefficiency 
should provide financial support for organizations that will face 
new data requirements. This is, in effect, public investment in 
private cybersecurity. These new technology and testing costs 
may particularly affect small businesses that are not publicly 
traded. Subsidizing initial costs, particularly for small busi-
nesses, will both increase compliance and reduce political resis-
tance to the new regulatory scheme. The public subsidy should 
be gradually phased out over time, as firms absorb initial over-
head costs of the new information systems, and as testing and 
monitoring costs fall. This method has been used in other regu-
latory contexts with cost burdens: companies with fewer than 
twenty-five workers, and average annual employee pay of less 
than $40,000, will receive tax credits to underwrite health in-
surance premiums under the new health care legislation; the 
subsidy lasts for up to two years for each business.404 Along 
similar lines, small businesses pay lower fees to the Food and 
Drug Administration for required medical device product re-
 
 402. FEI Survey: Average 2007 SOX Compliance Cost $1.7 Million, FEI, 
(Apr. 30, 2008), http://fei.mediaroom.com/index.php?s=43&item=204. 
 403. Cf. MUELLER, supra note 27, at 179–80 (discussing transformation of 
cybersecurity into a national security issue). 
 404. Courtney Rubin, What Health Care Reform Means for Your Business, 
INC. (Mar. 22, 2010), http://www.inc.com/news/articles/2010/03/health-care-reform 
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 652 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [96:584 
 
views.405 Spending tax revenues to support compliance costs is 
preferable to exempting small businesses from the cybersecuri-
ty requirements, which is another common approach to reduc-
ing regulatory burdens. (Congress and the SEC faced signifi-
cant pressure, for example, to exempt small businesses from 
the Sarbanes-Oxley requirements,406 and companies with fewer 
than fifty employees are exempt from offering their workers 
health insurance under the new health care legislation.407 Simi-
larly, small businesses are exempt, under certain conditions, 
from registering under the Securities Act of 1934 when offering 
securities.408) Thus, Congress should offer transitional support 
for organizations, particularly small ones, while they work to 
come into compliance with the information inefficiency re-
quirements of cybersecurity legislation. 
There are at least two ways that Congress could invest in 
organizations‘ creation of inefficient data storage. First, imple-
menting legislation could offer a tax credit to regulated enti-
ties.409 If Congress considered it important to ensure predicta-
bility of tax expenditures on this aspect of cybersecurity, it 
could either set a maximum total payment, as with tax credits 
for purchases of fuel-efficient hybrid cars,410 or it could combine 
a cap on per-entity deductions with a more limited scope of eli-
gibility. Second, legislation could require entities facing the 
new requirements to apply for grants that would cover part or 
all of their expenditures. For example, the economic stimulus 
legislation of 2009 created a similar funding system for broad-
 
 405. PMA Review Fees, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/ 
MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/HowtoMarketYourDevice/ 
PremarketSubmissions/PremarketApprovalPMA/UCM048161.htm ( last up-
dated Sept. 13, 2011). 
 406. See SEC Moves to Reduce Sarbanes-Oxley Costs, supra note 400. 
 407. Rubin, supra note 404. 
 408. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501 to .508 (2011) (―Regulation D‖). 
 409. The federal government uses a similar method to encourage provision 
of employer-based health insurance: employer premiums are excluded from 
employees‘ taxable income. See BOB LYKE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34767, 
THE TAX EXCLUSION FOR EMPLOYER-PROVIDED HEALTH INSURANCE: POLICY 
ISSUES REGARDING THE REPEAL DEBATE 9–11 (2008), available at http://www 
.allhealth.org/BriefingMaterials/RL34767-1359.pdf. 
 410. The credit is phased out based on the number of cars sold by each qua-
lifying manufacturer. See Qualified Hybrid Vehicles, INTERNAL REVENUE 
SERV., http://www.irs.gov/businesses/corporations/article/0,,id=203122,00.html 
( last updated Aug. 25, 2011). 
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band deployment projects.411 The grant system would impose 
higher administrative costs than a tax credit, but in return 
could achieve greater targeting of funding and greater cost pre-
dictability. 
Cybersecurity regulation should thus require entities with 
sufficiently important functions to store information inefficient-
ly by mandating that they be capable of operating for a week on 
redundant data, by having those organizations test their abili-
ties to do so, and by subsidizing on a short-term basis their in-
vestments in inefficiency. The next Section describes the second 
component of the proposed regulation: bolstering the positive 
aspects of access and alteration through inefficiency in network 
connections. 
B. OVERLAPPING STRANDS 
Don‘t become Egypt. 
This message is a succinct summary of the information-
based framework‘s second suggestion, which is to increase the 
inefficiency of network connections in the United States. Dur-
ing the popular uprising against the government of President 
Hosni Mubarak in early 2011, activists used Web-based meth-
ods such as e-mail, Twitter, and Facebook to plan demonstra-
tions and to exchange information.412 Egypt‘s government 
reacted with the Internet equivalent of the death penalty: it  
severed connections from Egyptian ISPs to the international 
network.413 There are two accounts of how Mubarak‘s govern-
ment took Egypt offline. In one, the government cut data links 
to the outside world not via clever technical means, but with 
phone calls to Egypt‘s five major ISPs, which provide routing to 
the wider Internet.414 In fifteen minutes on January 27, 2011, 
Egypt‘s ISPs withdrew BGP (Border Gateway Protocol) from 
routing tables, leaving no paths by which data could reach us-
ers inside the country.415 In the second, the key work was per-
formed by the country‘s Communications Ministry, which shut 
 
 411. See Program Information, NAT‘L TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN., http:// 
www2.ntia.doc.gov/information ( last visited Nov. 7, 2011) (describing broad-
band grant program under American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009). 
 412. Egypt Protests: Anti-Mubarak Demonstrators Arrested, BBC NEWS 
(Jan. 26, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12289475. 
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Shutdown Surprises Experts, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2011, at A13. 
 414. James Cowie, Egypt Leaves the Internet, RENESYS (Jan. 27, 2011), 
http://www.renesys.com/blog/2011/01/egypt-leaves-the-internet.shtml. 
 415. Id. 
 654 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [96:584 
 
down Egypt‘s Internet Exchange Point (IXP) in Cairo, blocking 
data flow across the digital border.416 The remaining links were 
cut by ISPs on orders from the Egyptian internal security ser-
vice.417 It helped considerably that Egypt was governed by an 
authoritarian regime that could deploy state pressure against 
ISP operators, and shut down the key IXP, with few checks.418 
The most important characteristic that let Mubarak‘s govern-
ment make the Internet go dark for Egyptians, though, is that 
there were only a handful of choke points that it needed to con-
trol to shut down connectivity. Five phone calls—or one flipped 
switch in a data center—knocked Egypt off-line.419 Egypt is a 
cautionary tale for cybersecurity efforts. Having a few points of 
failure where the network is vulnerable to disruption greatly 
increases the threat to information. Widely distributed, redun-
dant data is of little value if the pathways to it are cut.  
Ironically, influential voices in the current cybersecurity 
dialogue actually favor re-designing U.S. networks to look pre-
cisely like Egypt‘s topology. Indeed, the U.S. Department of De-
fense is moving to reduce the number of Internet connections 
between its NIRPNET network (used to share sensitive, but 
unclassified, information) and the wider Internet.420 Clarke and 
Knake argue for creating break points in America‘s connectivi-
ty to the wider Internet, allowing the U.S. to raise the digital 
drawbridge in case of an attack.421 But this tactic did not save 
Hosni Mubarak, and it would not save America, either. Data 
could still travel within U.S. networks—all an attacker would 
need would be access to computers located within American 
borders, such as via botnet.422 Moreover, the U.S. is arguably 
the country with the greatest dependency on information flow 
across the Internet.423 Breaking connections with the rest of the 
world might inflict more damage than it prevented. Even if sui-
 
 416. Ryan Singel, Report: Egypt Shut Down Net with Big Switch, Not 
Phone Calls, WIRED (Feb. 10, 2011), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/02/ 
egypt-off-switch/. An Internet Exchange Point is a location on the network 
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 418. Internet Filtering in Egypt, OPENNET INITIATIVE (Aug. 6, 2009), http:// 
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 420. CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 23, at 171. 
 421. Id. at 272–76. 
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cide is preferable to homicide, the body still dies. Finally, such 
a change in network layout would be surpassingly expensive. 
Consolidating connections to foreign networks would require 
private companies to give up valuable infrastructure, and 
would raise hard questions regarding which entities should re-
tain connectivity. In short, America should not envy Egypt‘s 
network. 
The information-focused theory suggests that Internet 
connectivity should be inefficient—it should be redundant, 
running over different types of networks in different physical 
and logical locations, under the control of different operators. 
Data should be capable of flowing across multiple networks, 
connected at multiple points that are physically and logically 
independent. The United States has a built-in advantage re-
garding inefficiency. Unlike countries such as China424 and 
Saudi Arabia,425 which designed their network topologies from 
scratch to enable concentrated points of control426 where meth-
ods such as filtering could be applied, America‘s networks grew 
chaotically and organically, based on market demand and or-
ganizational self-interest. However, U.S. connectivity still 
evinces a number of locations that could act as choke points.427 
Sean Gorman, a graduate student at George Mason University, 
mapped the major fiber optic cable routes in the U.S. for his 
Ph.D. dissertation; there are locations where physical disrup-
tion could have significant repercussions for Internet connectiv-
ity.428 (Indeed, Gorman has separately noted that a severed ca-
ble in 1990 shut down all three of New York City‘s airports, 
along with the New York Mercantile Exchange.)429 Moreover, 
the ongoing deployment of high-capacity fiber worsens the 
problem, as network providers consolidate onto those cables 
and reduce redundancy for cost reasons.430 And fiber optic 
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cables, if damaged, must be repaired manually in a time-
consuming process.431 
The physical connections along which Internet data travel 
tend to be co-located with transportation routes such as rail 
lines and highways; damage to the roads or tracks could also 
cut network connections.432 These routes themselves may have 
significant bottlenecks.433 Inefficient connections may be par-
ticularly scarce in urban areas,434 where constraints on physi-
cal location (such as the need to share utility poles, or conduits 
running beneath streets) may press providers to consolidate 
physical connectivity. And history matters: it is up to ten times 
as expensive to retrofit connectivity channels beneath roads as 
it is to install them during initial construction.435 Thus, it is 
particularly helpful to have inefficiency in physical modes of 
connectivity.  
This is an area where the United States faces an infra-
structure challenge. Most customers—both residential and 
business—are served by, at most, two broadband network pro-
viders: their local telephone service provider (offering DSL), 
and their local cable company.436 Both modalities generally rely 
on wired connections, and those wired connections are often co-
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bile wireless devices, such as smartphones, comprised 18%). See generally 
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Center_Broadband_Study_13Oct09.pdf (identifying the historical trends in 
American telecommunications expansion). 
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located for significant portions of their runs.437 Building ineffi-
ciency into the physical pathways, via diversity, creates resi-
lience in case of disruptions, and more rapid recovery from ser-
vice interruptions. For example, when a backhoe operator 
severed a fiber optic cable in the Yukon, Internet service was 
dramatically slowed.438 The network provider, Northwestel, 
was able to maintain some connectivity, however, because it 
had maintained a set of radio towers as a back-up system.439 
When Egypt‘s government cut Internet connections to the rest 
of the world, some users were able to maintain access by using 
satellite-based services.440 A group of hackers used fax ma-
chines to spread information about international dial-up Inter-
net access to Libyans when Libya‘s former government regime 
cut standard Internet access during anti-government demon-
strations.441 As described above, the attacks of September 11, 
2001 severed Internet connections even for firms that had pur-
chased redundant connections—but whose multiple Internet 
pathways flowed through the same physical space in Manhat-
tan.442 Thus, it would be useful to increase cybersecurity by 
causing network service providers to build out additional capac-
ity and connections. 
Regulating America‘s network providers, however, has his-
torically been challenging. Firms offering Internet access and 
transport have been quick to contest attempts to constrain 
their behavior in contexts from network neutrality,443 to com-
mon carriage requirements,444 to content filtering.445 Moreover, 
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967, 973–80 (2005). 
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the vast majority of network infrastructure in the U.S. is pri-
vately owned.446 Network providers have topologies and redun-
dancy levels that meet (but rarely exceed) their customers‘ de-
mands—routing data is a competitive market, and excess 
capacity creates needless cost. Most, if not all, peering agree-
ments between network service providers operate on a best-
efforts model: there are no service-level agreements that prom-
ise a certain measure of reliability or access.447 Accordingly, 
there are fewer contractual or competitive forces driving in-
vestment in guaranteed connectivity. Telecommunications 
companies were chastened by the industry‘s financial crisis in 
the early years of the twenty-first century, which was generat-
ed primarily by overinvestment in network capacity.448 Thus, 
creating inefficiency in network connectivity requires private 
entities to take on investments in capacity that cannot be cost-
justified as investments.449 Governmental regulation that 
forces providers to build out their networks without concomi-
tant demand is likely to be resisted fiercely. 
Regulation to increase the inefficiency of Internet connec-
tions in the U.S. should therefore do three things: subsidize in-
terconnection, mandate connectivity during disputes, and ex-
pand last-resort options. 
1. Subsidize 
Put simply, if the U.S. government believes network pro-
viders should deliberately incur the costs of inefficient connec-
tivity, it should pay for that belief. Routing data is a competi-
tive industry, and firms strive to match build-out to demand, 
and to projected demand.450 Requiring network providers to 
 
 446. NATIONAL STRATEGY TO SECURE CYBERSPACE, supra note 17, at 2. 
 447. Michael Kende, The Digital Handshake: Connecting Internet Back-
bones 6 (Fed. Commc‘ns Comm‘n, Office of Plans & Policy Working Paper No. 
32, 2000), available at http://transition.fcc.gov/Bureaus/OPP/working_papers/ 
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tion with Internet Networks, VERIZON, http://www.verizonbusiness.com/terms/ 
peering/ ( last visited Nov. 7, 2011). 
 448. ELI M. NOAM, MEDIA OWNERSHIP AND CONCENTRATION IN AMERICA 
268–69 (2009). 
 449. See generally Poulsen, supra note 437 (noting Sprint decided against 
physically separated data paths based on cost). 
 450. See, e.g., GAO, GAO-04-241, WIRE-BASED COMPETITION BENEFITED 
CONSUMERS IN SELECTED MARKETS 1, 12–17 (2004), available at http://www 
.gao.gov/new.items/d04241.pdf; Howard A. Shelanski, Adjusting Regulation to 
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carry excess capacity to ensure resilience in the face of a cy-
berattack will increase costs. There are two ways to cover these 
costs: by forcing ISPs to pass them through to customers, and 
by paying for them directly. The former is a tax, and the latter 
is a subsidy. The inefficient network connectivity is intended to 
benefit all American users (and perhaps all users generally) at-
tached to the Internet—it constitutes a benefit conferred by 
providers onto users who are not their customers, and therefore 
is a classic positive externality.451 Funding inefficient connec-
tions through a tax effectively causes an ISP‘s customers to 
subsidize Internet users generally and non-customers in par-
ticular. This may be acceptable if all users pay the tax at some 
point (because all users are customers of at least one ISP), but 
it seems more efficient to use a governmental subsidy. With a 
subsidy, administrative costs are lower: the State avoids the 
expense of collecting the tax from ISP customers, as it must in-
cur the costs of funding additional connectivity under either 
system. This approach also has the benefit of being more politi-
cally acceptable to network providers, who might otherwise op-
pose this change, although it does increase the financial burden 
on the public.  
Fortunately, the Obama administration has already shown 
a willingness to fund connectivity through the Department of 
Commerce‘s Broadband Technology Opportunities Program 
(BTOP), which distributed roughly $3.5 billion to build 120,000 
miles of broadband network to connect underserved communi-
ties.452 BTOP grew out of the American Recovery and Rein-
vestment Act of 2009, which used tax revenues to fund public 
infrastructure as an economic stimulus.453 Investing in redun-
dant connectivity is not merely a way to create additional In-
ternet infrastructure, it is also protection—insurance—against 
cybersecurity risks. Government is often the insurer of last 
resort for high-magnitude, low-incidence risks such as terror-
ism, floods, and natural disasters, and so public spending 
seems justified here.454 
 
 451. See Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Net-
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The governmental subsidy should cover three things: build-
out of additional network backbone; transit for Tier 2 ISPs in 
cases where peering is not economically feasible; and an annual 
grant system for Tier 3 ISPs.455 Building additional network 
backbone to create redundant connections is relatively 
straightforward: Congress should allocate money for the Na-
tional Telecommunications and Information Administration to 
spend. Adducing a budget figure for this spending is difficult, 
primarily because the size of the task is hard to scope. Maps of 
the Internet backbone at a physical level are fragmentary, part-
ly due to competitive concerns among providers, and partly due 
to physical security concerns among providers and with the 
government.456 As described above, a graduate student who 
produced the best such map was at significant risk of having 
his work classified, and his research has not been made public-
ly available. Thus, the first step that Congress should take is to 
fund NTIA to undertake a study to map the Internet backbone 
in the United States, including interconnection points, physical 
location, type of physical connectivity (such as fiber optic cable), 
ownership, and average and peak traffic data. The study should 
also attempt to estimate cost for major backbone segments: how 
much would it cost to create a redundant connection in a sepa-
rate physical location? To overcome provider reluctance to 
share competitive data, legislation authorizing the study 
should limit public dissemination to aggregate data, perhaps at 
the regional level, so as to obscure cost differences between 
providers.457 
Second—though perhaps most important—the subsidies 
should defray, in whole or in large part, the cost of additional 
connectivity for Tier 2 ISPs. Tier 2 network providers are those 
that are too small to route data solely through peering ar-
rangements; they must pay for access to at least some routes or 
networks.458 The inefficiency goal for Tier 2 providers is to elim-
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 455. On defining tiers of ISPs, see HANDBOOK OF ENTERPRISE INTEGRA-
TION 66–67 (Mostafa Hashem Sherif ed., 2010). 
 456. See supra notes 427–30 and accompanying text. 
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inate single points of failure and, optimally, to have the capa-
bility to route traffic (even at degraded speeds) even if connec-
tions to upstream Tier 1 ISPs were severed. Tier 2 providers 
should be encouraged to peer with one another. Where peering 
is not economically feasible, public funding should cover transit 
costs to ensure that each Tier 2 ISP can peer, and thereby route 
data in the event of loss of all upstream connectivity to Tier 1 
providers. To prevent Tier 2 providers from engaging in stra-
tegic behavior, such as charging other similarly situated pro-
viders for transit instead of peering with them, the funding 
formula should use an offset: each provider would receive funds 
to cover their transit costs, net of what they charge to other 
Tier 2 ISPs. This approach would also helpfully provide greater 
subsidies to smaller providers. 
Lastly, the subsidy should cover some costs of greater con-
nectivity, and hence greater inefficiency, for Tier 3 providers. 
These ISPs rarely peer, but instead purchase connectivity. 
Their networks may contain single points of failure, with but 
one source of upstream connectivity due to cost constraints.459 
While increasing inefficiency for Tier 3 ISPs seems attractive, it 
may not be sensible. It might be more efficient for downstream 
customers to instead purchase service from a Tier 2 ISP. Thus, 
it is not certain that dedicating funding to Tier 3 providers is 
desirable. A compromise solution would be for Congress to au-
thorize a set amount for grants by NTIA to Tier 3 ISPs, along 
the lines of the successful BTOP program.460 Tier 3 providers 
could apply for grants to cover additional connectivity, based on 
the number of downstream users served (with preference to 
larger ISPs); the level of competitive alternatives in their mar-
ket (with preference to providers of last resort); and the pro-
posal‘s cost-effectiveness. The funding criteria should be delib-
erately Darwinian: more efficient and effective Tier 3 ISPs 
should preferentially receive support. 
Proposing additional government spending is problematic 
at a time of economic downturn and political concern about 
budget deficits. However, spending is where political rhetoric 
about cybersecurity risks is tested. Consider, for example, that 
President Obama‘s 2012 budget requested only $548 million in 
 
Service Providers and Peering (Sept. 23, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), 
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spending for cybersecurity research and development,461 com-
pared with $921 million in research project grants for the Na-
tional Institute of Mental Health.462 Precautions are likely to be 
relatively inexpensive. Total BTOP expenditures on broadband 
of $3.48 billion, for example, were only 70 % of the National 
Cancer Institute‘s budget in 2010.463 They equal roughly 4.4% 
of estimated 2010 expenditures by the Department of Defense 
for research, development, testing, and evaluation.464 By com-
parison, the federal government allocated $1 billion for federal 
food safety465 and flood insurance programs466 in 2010. While 
the BTOP allocation is an inexact guide for cybersecurity in-
vestment, it is representative. If cybersecurity threats are real, 
government should be prepared to spend to abate them. Moreo-
ver, contemporary rhetoric that paints cybersecurity risks as 
national security threats can help make spending more palata-
ble, as it is politically difficult to oppose national security pro-
grams.467 
2. Mandate Connectivity During Disputes 
Second, regulation to produce inefficient connectivity 
should seek to preserve existing links between backbone pro-
viders. Disputes over peering arrangements—over costs of car-
rying traffic—are common between Tier 1 ISPs. Cogent, for ex-
ample, is frequently involved in peering disputes due to its cut-
rate pricing policy. Cogent became involved in tussles with 
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AOL in 2002, Level 3 and France Telecom in 2005, Limelight 
Networks in 2007, and Telia in 2008.468 In each case, Cogent or 
its adversary ―de-peered‖ the other—they stopped accepting the 
other provider‘s traffic, voluntarily severing a major network 
connection.469 This made it more difficult for their customers to 
communicate.470 For example, Martha Stewart Living‘s web-
site is hosted by Cogent, and during the company‘s dispute with 
Telia, Telia users could not reach it.471 De-peering moves are a 
common means to pressure another network provider to accede 
to terms.472 They are also a significant cybersecurity risk. 
Regulation should prohibit network providers from ceasing to 
carry their peers‘ traffic until alternative arrangements are 
made. 
Banning de-peering could significantly alter arrangements 
between backbone network providers. De-peering is self-help: it 
forces a connecting provider to choose between negotiating and 
finding alternative routing. Thus, de-peering may serve a help-
ful dispute resolution function. However, the costs of breaking 
connections between backbone providers are too high from a se-
curity perspective. De-peering reduces network redundancy, 
and could create a window of opportunity for cyberthreats. In 
addition, a ban would come with two significant limitations 
that would make its drawbacks less potent. First, it would ap-
ply only when network providers were operating under a peer-
ing agreement—where they were exchanging roughly equal da-
ta volumes, without cost recovery. Most peering disputes 
involve parties of roughly equal bargaining power.473 If provid-
ers were to opt to enter into a peering arrangement, they would 
do so knowing their tools for altering the bargain were more 
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limited than under fee-based carriage. Second, providers would 
be expressly permitted to initiate litigation to recover costs of 
traffic carried in excess of that transmitted—in short, to obtain 
damages as recompense. In addition, providers should be au-
thorized, after a cooling-off period of thirty days, to seek injunc-
tive relief in federal district court that would allow them to de-
peer.474 District courts should grant such injunctions under the 
standard four-part equitable analysis for preliminary injunc-
tions, with particular attention to the public interest factor.475 
This would allow providers an exit strategy from particularly 
unprofitable or troublesome arrangements, after a delay suffi-
cient to allow the other party to develop alternative routing 
strategies. 
The limited de-peering ban would strongly push providers 
to maintain peering arrangements with one another by increas-
ing the costs of exit. While this could cause ISPs to enter into 
peering arrangements more reluctantly, this is mitigated by 
peering‘s cost advantages for providers, who do not need to 
measure and bill traffic flow. Moreover, U.S. law does not hesi-
tate to limit negotiating tactics where there are significant 
third-party interests at stake. President Ronald Reagan fired 
air traffic controllers who violated a statutory ban on strik-
ing,476 and public safety workers such as police and firefighters 
are often prohibited from labor actions.477 Thus, a party‘s right 
to renegotiate terms by withholding may be barred because of 
negative effects on those not at the bargaining table. While 
temporarily preventing ISPs from de-peering will alter negotia-
tion dynamics, the limited cost is worth the gains in inefficiency 
of network paths. 
3. Expand Alternatives 
Lastly, regulation should seek to increase the heterogenei-
ty of Internet connectivity, at least as a fallback measure. The 
goal is to promote ad hoc measures that can route data when 
ordinary networks are disrupted. This approach has been ex-
 
 474. The thirty-day clock would begin when the ISP filed suit. 
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plored by scholars such as Yochai Benkler, who argues that 
open wireless networks could substitute—at least where there 
is adequate density of network devices—for traditional Internet 
access provisioning.478 This ―spectrum commons‖ approach sug-
gests a peer-production model of routing that is an inefficient 
yet highly flexible ad hoc solution.479 Ironically, this goal may 
require government to de-regulate. One example is the proposal 
by former FCC chair Kevin Martin to relinquish control over 
the 700MHz spectrum band to enable open wireless broad-
band.480 While Martin‘s proposal was not adopted,481 it shows 
that government can sometimes increase Internet access diver-
sity by giving up control. 
Ad hoc solutions can be surprisingly robust. The earth-
quake that struck Haiti on January 12, 2010 damaged most of 
the country‘s backbone network and telecom data centers.482 
Aid groups rely heavily on Internet-based communication to 
coordinate efforts. NetHope, a humanitarian technology organ-
ization, identified a non-governmental organization with satel-
lite-based Internet access, and created a patched-together mesh 
network linking recovery teams to the single access point.483 
NetHope‘s coordinator emphasized two lessons: ―Wireless is 
where it‘s at [and] . . . [w]e‘re far better off investing in emer-
gency preparedness . . . .‖484 Similarly, a team of researchers at 
the Research Centre for Disaster Resilience and Health at Aus-
tralia‘s Flinders University created the Serval Project, which 
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links mobile phone handsets into a local wi-fi network.485 Tests 
of Serval have shown that each handset can act as a router at a 
distance of up to several hundred meters.486 Engineers from the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology have developed FabFi, 
an ad hoc mesh wireless network that builds repeater stations 
for around $60, made from chicken wire and locally available 
materials, and that provides broadband Internet access over an 
area with a six kilometer radius.487  
An additional option would be for government itself to pro-
vide routing paths that are less dependent on wired networks. 
Various cities and municipalities have experimented with ―mu-
ni wi-fi‖ in the past several years, but most attempts foundered 
under cost pressures488 and telecommunications industry resis-
tance.489 However, municipal wi-fi, even in paid form or as a 
public-private partnership, offers significant positive cyberse-
curity externalities. It can serve as a fallback if commercial 
providers experience disruption. The experience of Minneapolis 
after the collapse of the city‘s I-35 bridge offers an example. 
The city had entered a partnership with US Internet, an ISP 
that eventually built a $20 million wireless network covering 
95% of Minneapolis.490 At the time of the collapse, US Internet 
had deployed a small test-network near the bridge.491 When 
emergency responders overloaded the local mobile phone net-
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work with traffic, US Internet made its wireless network avail-
able for free, enabling emergency services to coordinate more 
quickly and efficiently.492 Having governmental networks carry 
traffic in the event of disruption is a symbolic return to the In-
ternet‘s inception, when the network backbone was govern-
ment-owned and operated.493 Cybersecurity considerations 
make the prospect worth exploring again. 
Inefficient connectivity is a critical component of cyberse-
curity. Maintaining positive access and alteration requires that 
users be able to reach, and interact with, information via mul-
tiple pathways. Yet, competitive pressures in the telecommuni-
cations industry push in precisely the opposite direction: to-
wards consolidation of routes. Regulatory efforts should thus 
subsidize some connectivity directly, require ISPs who peer to 
continue peering during disputes, and expand options for carri-
ers of last resort. As the next Section notes, while these mea-
sures will greatly augment cybersecurity‘s positive aspects, 
they require tradeoffs. 
C. SCYLLA AND CHARYBDIS 
Cybersecurity requires hard choices. Like Odysseus con-
fronting the mythical Greek sea monsters of Scylla and Cha-
rybdis, avoiding one peril risks another. The tradeoffs in cyber-
security are between the positive and negative ranges of access 
and alteration. Storing information in more locations, with 
more pathways to it, increases not only the probability that au-
thorized users will engage with it, but that unauthorized ones 
will also do so. This inverse relationship is not inevitable, but it 
is likely, particularly when cost considerations are added. 
Inefficiency does not necessarily increase the risk of nega-
tive access or alteration. Organizations could reduce both types 
of cybersecurity threats by storing data partially and heteroge-
neously. This protects information analogously to how the bib-
liophiles in Ray Bradbury‘s novel Fahrenheit 451 preserve 
books in a world where they are banned and subject to destruc-
tion.494 Guy Montag, the fireman protagonist, has memorized 
the Book of Ecclesiastes.495 His compatriots have committed 
 
 492. Id. 
 493. See MILTON MUELLER, RULING THE ROOT 74–75 (2004) (describing 
the pre-Internet network operated by the U.S. Defense Department that con-
nected research scientists in university, military, and industrial sites). 
 494. RAY BRADBURY, FAHRENHEIT 451, at 35–40 (1st ed. 1953). 
 495. Id. at 150. 
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other chapters to memory.496 No single person has memorized 
the entire Bible, so no single death can delete it from human 
knowledge—and, analogously, no single capture provides an at-
tacker with the whole book.497 An inefficiency approach with 
partial storage breaks information into pieces that are stored in 
multiple locations.498 Consider, for example, an organization 
with four information repositories. The organization can split 
its data into quarters (A, B, C, and D), and store them with one 
quarter per location: 
 
Location 1: A Location 2: B 
Location 3: C Location 4: D 
 
It can also achieve greater inefficiency, and hence easier 
recovery, at the cost of doubling its storage requirements, with 
two quarters per location: 
 
Location 1: A, B Location 2: B, C 
Location 3: C, D Location 4: D, A 
 
A cyberthreat must compromise three of four locations to 
reassemble the entirety of the data (although the organization 
must also draw information from three places to recover its  
data). 
An additional way to mitigate inefficiency‘s risks of unau-
thorized access and alteration is to store information heteroge-
neously, using multiple operating systems, applications, hard-
ware, and encryption. A vulnerability in one operating system 
or application thus could expose part of the information, but 
not all of it. Thus, heterogeneity immunizes inefficient storage 
from a single attack vector in the way that mixed crop agricul-
ture protects against devastation by a single pest or parasite.499 
However, heterogeneity costs more. Most organizations 
standardize on a single operating system and application plat-
 
 496. Id. at 153. 
 497. Cf. id. at 151 (explaining that each book of the Gospels is committed to 
memory by different individuals). 
 498. BitTorrent functions similarly. See Loewenstern, supra note 310. 
 499. Sandra Díaz et al., Biodiversity Regulation of Ecosystem Services, in 1 
ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING 297, 317 (Rashid Hassan et al. eds., 
2005). 
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form—their servers run Windows or Linux, but not both.500 
Maintaining multiple variants of each type of program increas-
es the expense and complexity of IT infrastructure.501 Even if 
security efforts are effective, they may appear unnecessary—
observers may conclude that threats were overstated, rather 
than mitigated. Heterogeneity can be helpful, but it is costly. 
This Article‘s proposed inefficiency-based solutions would 
improve authorized users‘ abilities to access and alter informa-
tion. However, there are likely to be tradeoffs between improv-
ing cybersecurity‘s positive aspects, and improving its negative 
ones. Future work will explore cybersecurity‘s negative aspects. 
The next Part argues that an information-oriented theory is vi-
tal not only to improving security, but also to preventing a fun-
damental shift in America‘s attitude towards open communica-
tion on the Internet. 
V.  THE STAKES: RE-FIGHTING OLD WARS   
The stakes at issue in which theoretical model we choose 
for cybersecurity are considerable. The Internet‘s current core 
design permits open, anonymous communication by default—
an architectural choice reflecting key American normative 
commitments.502 Cybersecurity risks, though, increasingly 
drive demands for reform, especially when posed as threats to 
U.S. national security.503 If conventional approaches, with their 
emphasis on ascertaining the identity and intent of those creat-
ing such threats, hold sway, the U.S. is likely to shift its em-
phasis from protecting open communication to prioritizing au-
thentication. The consequences would be profound, and 
harmful. They would include not only harm to the Internet‘s 
generative capacity, but even more importantly to America‘s 
role in checking attempts to quell on-line expression, particu-
larly by authoritarian states such as China and Russia.504 
 
 500. See, e.g., Tom Duffy, Standard Issue, NETWORK WORLD, Apr. 3, 2000, 
at 76 (discussing the benefits of system standardization). 
 501. See, e.g., M. GORDON HUNTER, CONTEMPORARY CHIEF INFORMATION 
OFFICERS: MANAGEMENT EXPERIENCES 61 (2007) (describing how standardi-
zation reduced time spent on maintenance and helped control IT costs). 
 502. Paul Schiff Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151 U. PA. L. 
REV. 311, 520 (2002). 
 503. See Dycus, supra note 22, at 155–56 (―The very future of the Republic 
may depend on our ability not only to protect ourselves from enemies armed 
with cyber weapons, but also to use such weapons wisely ourselves.‖). 
 504. See Viktor Mayer-Schönberger & Malte Ziewitz, Jefferson Rebuffed: 
The United States and the Future of Internet Governance, 8 COLUM. SCI. & 
 670 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [96:584 
 
These perils underscore the importance of which theory we 
adopt to deal with cyber-risks. 
The struggle over cybersecurity recapitulates the defini-
tional battles of the early Internet boom, which pitted cyber-
exceptionalists505 against cyber-realists.506 Although the cyber-
realists won that debate, the cyber-exceptionalists had a criti-
cal insight: the Internet is more resistant to control than other 
communication modalities—in its current form.507 U.S. hege-
mony over key aspects of Internet architecture has maintained 
this implicit preference for free communication over gate keep-
ing, even in the face of dogged criticism and opposition.508  
This default freedom to communicate, though, is a relic of 
the Internet‘s history. The core protocols were designed primar-
ily by American computer scientists and engineers. It is no ac-
cident that the Internet‘s architecture embodies to a consider-
able degree the American constitution‘s preference and 
protections for free expression and access to information.509 The 
default position of American constitutional jurisprudence, and 
of the Internet‘s design, is to permit communication, including 
 
TECH. L. REV. 188, 203–04 (2007) (explaining the U.S. opposed the internatio-
nalization of Internet governance, in part, because it would give nations like 
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 506. See generally JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE IN-
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 507. See Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might 
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 508. See generally MUELLER, supra note 27, at 62–64 (discussing how the 
U.S. government exercises control over Internet governance by being the only 
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anonymous communication.510 Deviations from that standard 
require special justification, or technological mechanisms.511 
Security fears, though, could lead America—no doubt with 
reluctance—to prioritize safety over freedom. Pressures to 
make the Internet more secure through attribution are mount-
ing.512 They could become irresistible if America suffers a high-
profile cybersecurity incident. Security policy is often reactive. 
The Transportation Security Administration began screening 
airline passengers‘ shoes after Richard Reid attempted to ignite 
explosives stored in his sneakers on a flight.513 After a data 
spill, the Los Alamos National Laboratory not only banned the 
use of flash drives, but filled USB ports on its workstations 
with super glue.514 The USA PATRIOT act, with its smorgas-
bord of law enforcement measures, was passed quickly in the 
days following the attacks of September 11, 2001.515 As John 
W. Kingdon emphasizes, when a focusing incident creates a pol-
icy window, policymakers and legislators generally opt for pre-
packaged measures rather than crafting responses from 
scratch.516 Thus, if conventional methodologies for cybersecuri-
ty continue to dominate, the likely response to a significant cy-
ber-incident would be to address those theories‘ core concern: 
the lack of attribution in the Internet‘s core design. The pre-
positioned solution for a cybersecurity problem that attracts 
major public notice, and generates demands for a fix, is to 
change how the Internet functions. 
Such architectural changes will inevitably undercut the 
medium‘s power as a communications platform, damaging what 
 
 510. See Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky & Thomas F. Cotter, Authorship, Au-
diences, and Anonymous Speech, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1537, 1577–89 
(2007). 
 511. See Network Working Gr, RFC 1958—Architectural Principles of the 
Internet, IETF (B. Carpenter ed., June 1996), http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1958.txt. 
 512. See, e.g., Kirsten Doyle, Focus on Cyber War Defence, ITWEB (Oct. 13, 
2010), http://www.itweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id= 
37739:focus-on-cyber-war-defence&catid=69&Itemid=58 (quoting Richard Clark, 
Chairman of Good Harbor Consulting, as suggesting the design of ―another, 
more secure Internet‖). 
 513. Pam Belluck & Kenneth Chang, Shoes Were a ‗Homemade Bomb,‘ 
F.B.I. Agent Says, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 2001, at B1. 
 514. Daniel Tynan, Closed-Door Policy, FED TECH (Sept. 10, 2007), http:// 
fedtechmagazine.com/article.asp?item_id=352.  
 515. Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001). 
 516. JOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES 
165 (2003). 
 672 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [96:584 
 
Jonathan Zittrain calls its ―generativity.‖517 This shift is simi-
lar to what Zittrain fears will occur as the result of users‘ secu-
rity worries, driving them onto locked-down devices such as the 
iPad rather than open platforms such as Android.518 However, 
the cybersecurity sea change will emanate from the top down, 
rather than bottom up; it will originate with governments (es-
pecially America‘s), not consumers, and hence is likely to be 
more resistant to alteration.  
More importantly, the change in American priorities will 
significantly re-align stakeholder interests in Internet design. 
U.S. control over key Internet architecture has enabled Ameri-
ca to resist calls by authoritarian countries to restrict free ex-
pression on-line.519 States such as China and Russia work to 
control the ambit of Internet communication within their bor-
ders, particularly if it seems to threaten internal political heg-
emony.520 American efforts to embed attribution into the Inter-
net would unintentionally bolster their endeavors. Moreover, it 
would provide such states not only with new technological ca-
pabilities, but with rhetorical cover: disagreements would shift 
from whether to limit communication, to when.521 This norma-
tive shift would weaken America‘s advocacy for free expression, 
and would align the U.S. in a partnership of convenience with 
countries that evince no real commitment to the promise of open 
communication. Such changes, and losses, represent the risk of 
using law reflexively to regulate cybersecurity without a theoret-
ical orientation that guides its application. 
In short, the current design of the Internet, where informa-
tion routes by default and where security is pushed to the edges 
of the network, is a historical accident—an accident that cyber-
security concerns can remediate, to our collective detriment, if 
we choose the wrong solutions. 
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  CONCLUSION   
Preventing cyberattacks is impossible. Retaliation does not 
remediate them. Cybersecurity must come to grips with this 
reality. 
This Article‘s information-oriented theory of cybersecurity 
focuses on resilience and recovery, rather than on prevention 
and retaliation, as conventional scholarly models do. Computer 
software is too complex to hope that systems can be sufficiently 
hardened to prevent attacks.522 Knowing that the United States 
and Israel are behind the Stuxnet cyberweapon has not helped 
Iran‘s nuclear program recover ground. Understanding that 
their government intended to prevent them from organizing did 
not help Egyptian protesters communicate any more readily. In 
short, current approaches to cybersecurity aim at goals that are 
nearly impossible to achieve, and unhelpful if attained. The in-
formation-focused approach concentrates usefully on identify-
ing, and protecting, what users seek to accomplish on-line. 
We should also recognize that law is a limited tool for cy-
bersecurity. Cyberthreats are inherently cross-border, and can 
be launched from anywhere with sufficient connectivity. Effec-
tive legal regulation thus requires consensus among sovereigns, 
whether those sovereigns are nation-states or relevant interna-
tional bodies such as the United Nations. And states presently 
differ about what constitutes cybersecurity. Russia, for exam-
ple, sees criticism of its government, which it terms ―informa-
tion war,‖ as a cyberthreat.523 Even the U.S. has mixed incen-
tives for legal regulation: strengthening cyberdefenses could 
reduce America‘s vulnerabilities, but also its capability to 
mount its own attacks. Ineffective legal measures may be worse 
than none at all, as they could generate a false sense of security 
while closing the policy window for reform.524 
Yet inefficiency holds promise for cybersecurity. It confers 
resilience in other contexts. Index funds for stock investing sa-
crifice the potential for enormous gains to protect against cata-
strophic losses, as Enron‘s employees learned painfully.525 Er-
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rors in genetic replication enable adaptation to ecological 
changes. The results are not always desirable: BitTorrent‘s in-
efficient architecture helps downloaders evade copyright in-
fringement liability,526 and the HIV virus benefits from error-
prone replication to evade immune system defenses.527 But the 
lesson for cybersecurity is clear—inefficiency works. 
The next Article in this project will take up the challenges 
of cybersecurity‘s negative aspects: preventing unauthorized 
access and alteration of information, and detecting when they 
have occurred. This Article seeks to define cybersecurity‘s con-
undrum, and to offer a path to solving it. 
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